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"[Y]ou are now the property of the U.S. Marine Corps."'
I. INTRODUCTION
As many as 700 prisoners2 from forty-four different countries
have been held at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base (GBNB) in Cuba3
as a result of the "war on terror" initiated by the United States after the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9-11). 4 The dehumanizing
greeting quoted above is what detainees are told when they arrive at
Guantanamo Bay.5  Recently released detainees have asserted:
"[N]one of us were ever told why we were in Cuba.... [W]henever
any of us asked [what an enemy combatant 6 was] they refused to give
us a definition."'7 "[D]etainees were admitting to almost any of the al-
legations put to them simply to alleviate the harsh conditions."8 One
released detainee stated, "[Wlhen you are detained in those condi-
tions, you are entirely powerless and have no way of having your
1. RHUHEL AHMED, AsIF IQBAL, & SHAFIQ RASUL, TIPTON REPORT: DETENTION IN
AFGHANISTAN AND GUANTANAMO BAY 56 (July 26, 2004), available at http://www.ccr-
ny.org/v2/legal/september_11 thldocs/Guantanamocomposite-statementFINAL.pdf [herein-
after TIPTON REPORT]; see also Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, Guantdnamo: 4 Years Too
Many-New Torture Testimonies (Jan. 11, 2006), http://web.amnesty.org/library/In-
dex/ENGAMR510082006.
2. James McGarrah, Dir., Dep't of Defense Office for the Admin. Review of the Det. of
Enemy Combatants, Defense Department Special Briefing on Administrative Review Boards
for Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (July 8, 2005), http://www.defenselink.mil/tran-
scripts/2005/tr20050708-3322.htn.
3. Nancy Gibbs, Inside "The Wire," TIME, Dec. 8, 2003, at 40. The United States exer-
cises control over the naval base pursuant to a lease agreement with Cuba entered into in
1934, which grants it complete jurisdiction and control over the base. Treaty Defining Rela-
tions with Cuba, U.S.-Cuba, May 29, 1934, 48 Stat. 1683 [hereinafter Lease Agreement].
4. See Authorization for Use of Military Force of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224 [hereinafter AUMF]. On September 18, 2001 Congress authorized the President to use
"all necessary and appropriate force" against those connected to the terrorist attacks of 9-11.
Id.
5. TIPTON REPORT, supra note 1, 56.
6. The Supreme Court defined "enemy combatant [as] an individual who, [the govern-
ment] alleges, was 'part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition part-
ners' in Afghanistan and who 'engaged in an armed conflict against the United States' there."
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004) (quoting Brief for the Respondents at 3, Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696)).
7. TIPTON REPORT, supra note 1, 154.
8. Id.[ 156.
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voice heard. This has led me and many others to 'cooperate' and say
or do anything to get away."9 Released detainees have reported that
during interviews, interrogators would repeatedly demand, "[J]ust say
you're a fighter."' In response to threats of life-long detention at
Guantanamo Bay, detainees eventually said yes out of desperation."
During the whole time that we were in Guantanamo, we were at a
high level of fear... The guards would say to us "we could kill you
at any time... the world doesn't know you're here, all they know
is that you're missing and we could kill you and no one would
know." [W]e were never given access to legal advice. I asked...
but they just said that this is not America this is Cuba and you have
no rights here. 12
The story of Mamdouh Habib, an Australian citizen who traveled
to Pakistan in August 2001 to look for work and a Moslem school for
his teenage children, is particularly compelling. 3 Similar to many
other foreign nationals detained at the GBNB, Habib was captured far
from the hostilities in Afghanistan on suspicion of having close ties to
the terrorist organization al Qaeda. 4 In October 2001, he was arrested
in Pakistan, held in Egypt, and transferred to Guantanamo Bay.'5
Pakistan's interior minister admitted the United States requested
Habib's transfer to Egypt. 16 According to Habib, while imprisoned in
9. Id. 160.
10. Id. W 80-90.
11. Id. V 80-90, 106-109.
12. Id. W 134, 252.
13. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at 3, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (No. 03-
334).
14. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 446-47 (D.D.C. 2005).
"[Dietainees at [the GBNB] ... presently seeking habeas relief... include men who were
taken into custody as far away from Afghanistan as Gambia, Zambia, Bosnia, and Thailand."
Id. at 446. "Some have already been detained as long as three years... [and] may never have
been close to an actual battlefield... [nor] raised conventional arms against the United States
... nonetheless [they have been detained] ... based on conclusions that they have ties to al
Qaeda or other terrorist organizations." Id. at 446-47.
15. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, supra note 13, at 3.
16. HUM. RTS. WATCH, GETrING AWAY WITH TORTURE? COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY FOR
THE U.S. ABUSE OF DETAINEES 60 (2005) (citing The Trials of Mamdouh Habib (SBS televi-
sion broadcast July 7, 2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/
us0405/us0405.pdf).
The post 9/11 rendition of terror suspects was first reported in The Washington
Post in December 2002, which described transfers to countries including Syria,
Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco, where they were
tortured or otherwise mistreated. One official was quoted as saying, "We don't
kick the [expletive] out of them. We send them to other countries so they can kick
the [expletive] out of them."
3
Pennelle: The Guantanamo Gap: Can Foreign Nationals Obtain Redress for Prol
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2006
306 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 36
Egypt, "he was suspended from hooks... rammed with an electric
cattle prod, forced to stand tip-toe in a water-filled room [to keep from
drowning], and threatened with a German Shepard [sic] [guard] dog
[while stripped naked]."' 7 Habib claims, "Among those overseeing
the torture... were English-speaking operatives with American ac-
cents."1 8 In early 2002, Habib was transferred to the GBNB where he
alleges he suffered further cruel and degrading treatment. 9 In January
2005, after being detained for more than three years without charges,
Habib was repatriated to Australia, where he was reunited with his
wife and four children.20
The United States failed to press any charges against Habib, pre-
sumably because it was unable to gather any evidence of his alleged
connection to al Qaeda. 21 The alleged treatment of Habib unques-
tionably violates many internationally recognized human rights.22
However, his case is not unique. As of October 2005, approximately
505 foreign nationals were in detention at the GBNB. 2 Prior to this
date, the government transferred sixty-eight detainees to the custody
of other governments and released 178 outright.24 It is probable that
the released detainees were innocent of any terrorist activity and, in
the words of the GBNB's Deputy Camp Commander, were simply
"victims of circumstance. ' 25 The U.S. government has asserted that it
Id. (quoting Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations,
WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 2002, at Al.)
17. Id. (citing Declaration of Joseph Marguilies Attached to Pl.'s Application for TRO,
Habib v. Bush, No. 02-CV-1 130 (D.D.C. Nov. 24, 2004)).
18. Joe Feuerherd, Secret Detentions Cover Torture, Say "Enemy Combatant" Advo-
cates, NAT'L CATH. REP., Jan. 21, 2005, available at http://natcath.org/NCROnline/
archives2/2005a/012105/012105 a.php.
19. Id. One Australian lawyer described Habib's treatment in Guantanamo Bay: "[T]he
guards brought a prostitute who [stood over him] naked while he was strapped to the floor and
menstruated on him. Photographs of Habib's wife and four children were defaced. [They
said to him]: 'It's a shame we had to kill your family."' John Pilger, John Pilger Finds Fear
and Silence in Australia, NEW STATESMAN, Feb. 7, 2005, http://www.newstatesman.com/
200502070017.
20. Raymond Bonner, Australian's Long Path in the U.S. Antiterrorism Maze, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 29, 2005, at A4; see also Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, supra note 13, at 3.
21. Bonner, supra note 20.
22. See discussion infra Parts Il.A, IV.B. 1, and IV.B.2.
23. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Detainee Transfer Announced (Oct. 1, 2005),
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2005/nr20051001-4826.html [hereinafter DOD Detainee
Transfer Announced].
24. Id.
25. Katharine Q. Seelye, A Nation Challenged: Captives; An Uneasy Routine at Cuba
Prison Camp, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2002, at A8 (quoting Deputy Camp Commander Lt. Col.
Bill Cline).
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does not have to pay compensation to released detainees; "[t]here is
no basis in U.S. law to pay claims to those captured and detained as a
result of combat activities ... 26 This stance raises a serious con-
cern: if those who have been wrongfully detained and possibly tor-
tured at the direction of the United States have no legal remedies, how
are those responsible for abuses going to be held accountable?
The need to create a remedy for these reported human rights vio-
lations is of paramount importance; detention at the GBNB is appar-
ently indefinite and thus similar rights violations are likely continu-
ing.2 7  Indeed, there are plans to increase the GBNB's capacity to
2,000 detainees. 28  Faced with indefinite detention under these harsh
conditions, thirty-four detainees have attempted suicide, 29 and many
detainees have gone on hunger strikes, sometimes resulting in force-
feeding through nasal tubes.3" To maintain legitimacy for the capture
and prolonged detention of alleged "enemy combatants,"'" the U.S.
government needs to provide a remedy to those foreign nationals who
are later determined to be innocent of any wrongdoing.
This Comment will explore the avenues of redress currently avail-
able to foreign nationals, such as Mamdouh Habib, who arguably suf-
fered rights violations, such as prolonged arbitrary detention and tor-
ture.32 After evaluating the inadequacies of potential judicial avenues
of civil redress against the U.S. government and other actors, this
Comment suggests an alternative dispute resolution mechanism, the
creation of an innovative congressional remedy based on the om-
budsman concept.33 Other countries have employed ombudsmen ef-
26. Paisley Dodds, Damages Sought for Guantanamo Detainees, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Oct. 27, 2004 (quoting Pentagon spokesman Major Michael Shavers), available at
http://www.political-news.org/breaking/464/damages-sought-for-guantanamo-detainees.html.
27. See Scott McClellan, White House Press Sec'y, Press Briefing (June 15, 2005),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/20050615-11.html#b. "There are no plans
at this time for shutting down Guantanamo Bay. No one has come forward with a better al-
ternative for where we keep these enemy combatants." Id.
28. Seelye, supra note 25.
29. World Digest, Cuba: Guantanamo Inmate Tries to Kill Himself, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, Jan. 7, 2004, at A8; see also TIPTON REPORT, supra note 1, [ 265-266 ("While [in
GBNB] a large number of people tried to commit suicide[, many repeatedly,] [t]he attempts
undoubtedly go into several hundred altogether, at least.").
30. Guantanamo Detainee Pleads to Die, ALJAZEERA.NET, Oct. 26, 2005, http://english.
aljazeera.netlNR/exeres/236E5000-43EB-4DC3-9BCO-6C521563E5AC.htm.
31. See supra note 6.
32. The definition of these violations depends on the statute under which recovery is
sought.
33. Interview with Lawrence Benner, Professor of Law, California Western School of
Law, in San Diego, Cal. (Aug. 19, 2005).
20061 307
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fectively to investigate public complaints of government human
rights violations. 4  The ombudsman concept addresses the defects
present in other remedies. It not only compensates victims, but also
provides a means by which to hold individuals accountable for human
rights violations.
This Comment discusses three sources of remedial relief arguably
available to foreign nationals detained in the "war on terror": The
Federal Tort Claims Act35 (FTCA), the Alien Tort Statute 36 (ATS), and
a common law action for constitutional torts created under Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.37 Part II
discusses the events leading to prisoner detention at the GBNB and
summarizes the issues currently before the federal courts. Part III ex-
amines the use of the FITCA against the U.S. government and dis-
cusses the obstacles presented by its various exceptions. In particular,
an analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Sosa v. Al-
varez-Machain38 illustrates the negative consequences of the Court's
construction of the FFCA's foreign country exception. Part IV ana-
lyzes the types of violations actionable under the ATS. It also ex-
plains why it is difficult to sue the U.S. government and other non-
governmental actors involved in the "war on terror" under the ATS.
Part V discusses the possibility of bringing a Bivens action by extend-
ing constitutional rights to foreign nationals detained at the GBNB. It
also examines the effect of the qualified immunity doctrine on such a
Bivens action. Part VI will discuss issues of justiciability. Assuming
jurisdictional obstacles can be overcome, the political question doc-
trine may nevertheless bar a court from hearing a detainee's claim.
Part VII will explore alternative remedies outside the judiciary. In
particular, it will discuss setting up a claims commission for detainees
pursuant to the Foreign Claims Act.39 This proposed GBNB claims
commission is then compared to a similar commission in Iraq that
34. See discussion infra Part VIII.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000).
36. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). This act has as been referred to as
the "Alien Tort Claims Act" or the "Alien Tort Act." Id. This Comment uses the title and
acronym employed by the most recent Supreme Court case discussing the ATS, Sosa v. Alva-
rez-Machain. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004).
37. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
389, 397 (1971).
38. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
39. Foreign Claims Act, 10 U.S.C.S § 2734 (LexisNexis 2005) (authorizing claims
commissions to be set up where property loss, personal injury, or death results from the non-
combat activities of the armed forces in foreign countries).
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compensates Iraqis injured by the conduct of U.S. soldiers. Conclud-
ing no clear avenue currently exists by which innocent foreign na-
tional detainees may obtain adequate redress for their alleged human
rights violations, Part VIII proposes the creation of a Human Rights
Ombudsman Commission. Such a narrowly tailored administrative
remedy would cure justiciability problems and create a forum where
foreign nationals can voice their grievances and obtain redress for
human rights violations.
II. BACKGROUND
In response to the attacks of 9-11, Congress passed the Authoriza-
tion for Use of Military Force (AUMF) on September 18, 2001.4 The
AUMF authorized the President to "use all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that oc-
curred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or per-
sons, in order to prevent any future attacks of international terrorism
against the United States .... ,,4' Pursuant to the AUMF, the President
issued an Order of Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War against Terrorism (Detention Order).4 2 The Su-
preme Court held the AUMF gave explicit congressional authorization
for the detention of individuals who fought against the United States
in Afghanistan as part of the Taliban.43 This detention of enemy com-
batants could last for the duration of the conflict in Afghanistan.' Be-
cause the detention of enemy soldiers "is so fundamental and accepted
an [sic] incident to war[, it was considered by the Court to] be an ex-
ercise of the 'necessary and appropriate force' Congress has author-
ized the President to use."45
40. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
41. Id.
42. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terror-
ism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001). This order authorizes the Secretary of Defense to
detain anyone the President has reason to believe is a member of al Qaeda, has participated in
acts of international terrorism against the United States, or has aided,or harbored individuals
involved in such terrorist acts. Id.
43. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004). The Taliban is an "organization
known to have supported the al Qaeda terrorist network responsible for [the 9-111 attacks
.I d .
44. id.
45. Id.
2006] 309
7
Pennelle: The Guantanamo Gap: Can Foreign Nationals Obtain Redress for Prol
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2006
310 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 36
Since this authorization, the President has seized more than 700
prisoners and detained them at the GBNB.46 Although the United
States began detaining so-called "enemy combatants" in early 2002, 47
it was not until February 2004 that the first charges were pressed
against two detainees for conspiracy to commit war crimes.48  As of
October 2004, the U.S. Government had charged only four detainees
with war crimes.49  Therefore, from early 2002 until at least June
2004, the vast majority of foreign nationals at GBNB were held in-
communicado, without the opportunity to challenge their enemy com-
batant status before a competent tribunal, without access to counsel,
and without knowledge of the basis upon which they were being
held."°
The Supreme Court has recently decided a string of cases in rela-
tion to the rights of citizen and non-citizen detainees held at the
GBNB. In June 2004 the Supreme Court held in Rasul v. Bush5 that
federal district courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions
by foreign nationals challenging their detention at the GBNB.12 Since
then, litigation has focused on determining what substantive due proc-
ess rights, if any, are due to foreign national detainees. District courts
hearing these petitions for writs of habeas corpus have come to vary-
ing decisions.53 Currently, the status of what rights are due to foreign
46. McGarrah, supra note 2.
47. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 446 (D.D.C. 2005).
48. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Two Guantanamo Detainees Charged (Feb. 24,
2004), http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040224-0363.html [hereinafter DOD
Two Guantanamo Detainees Charged].
49. Dodds, supra note 26.
50. Guantanamo, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 447.
51. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
52. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 481 ("Aliens held at the base, no less than American citizens, are
entitled to invoke the federal courts' authority under § 2241."). See generally 28 U.S.C.A §
2241 (2006) (federal statute governing court's power to grant a writ of habeas corpus).
53. Post Rasul, "several new habeas cases were filed on behalf of... detainees in addi-
tion to those cases that were remanded by the [Supreme] Court as part of Rasul,]" in efforts
to challenge the legality of the detainees' indefinite detention. In re Guantanamo Detainee
Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 451. The Guantanamo court held that aliens detained at the GBNB
possess cognizable Fifth Amendment due process rights and cannot be deprived of their lib-
erty without due process of the law. Id at 445. The court also found that detainees shall be
given the same process as was enunciated in Hamdi for American citizens, since "[tlhere is no
practical difference between incarceration at the hands of one's own government and incar-
ceration at the hands of a foreign government; significant liberty is deprived in both situations
regardless of the jailer's nationality." Id. at 465; see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,
533 (2004) (holding a U.S. citizen detained by the U.S. government wishing to challenge his
classification as an enemy combatant is constitutionally entitled to due process). But see
Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 320-21 (D.D.C. 2005), appeal docketed sub nom.
8
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nationals detained at the GBNB remains unresolved, as contradictory
district court opinions are currently pending on appeal. 54
Current efforts on behalf of foreign national detainees are focused
both on classifying them as enemy combatants to afford them due
process rights and on preventing the government from transferring
them out of U.S. jurisdiction before making such a determination.55
The federal judiciary has given little, if any, hint as to what civil
remedies are available to detainees against the U.S. government for
prolonged arbitrary detention and torture. However, the Court in Ra-
sul did suggest that being "held in Executive detention for more than
Boumediene v. Bush, 05-5062, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 14580 (D.D.C. July, 18, 2005) (hold-
ing "non-[citizen] aliens captured and detained pursuant to the AUMF and the President's De-
tention Order" have no cognizable substantive constitutional rights, including a right to due
process or protection from cruel and unusual punishment); cf Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386,
394-95 (4th Cir. 2005). In response to U.S. citizen Padilla's argument that military detention
is inappropriate because he is subject to criminal prosecution, the Fourth Circuit responded:
[T]he availability of criminal process cannot be determinative of the power to de-
tain, if for no other reason than that criminal prosecution may well not achieve the
very purpose for which detention is authorized in the first place-the prevention of
return to the field of battle .... [C]riminal prosecution would impede the Execu-
tive in its efforts to gather intelligence from the detainee ... [and] ensure that the
detainee does not pose a continuing threat to national security even as he is con-
fined ....
Id.
54. The district court has certified its refusal to grant the U.S. government a motion to
dismiss on the question of whether foreign nationals possess due process rights under the U.S.
Constitution for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). In re Guantanamo
Detainee Cases, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5295 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 2005), appeal docketed, No. 05-
8003 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 10, 2005). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit has scheduled oral argument for early September 2006 on the question of whether non-
resident aliens detained at Guantanamo Bay have a viable constitutional basis to seek a writ of
habeas corpus. Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 320-21 (D.D.C. 2005), appeal docketed
sub nom. Boumediene v. Bush, 05-5062, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 14580 (D.D.C. July 18,
2005).
55. See Almurbati v. Bush, 366 F. Supp. 2d 72, 73-74 (D.D.C. 2005). Fearing transfer
by the U.S. government to an area depriving federal courts of jurisdiction, foreign nationals
designated as enemy combatants and detained at the GBNB asked the court to issue a pre-
liminary injunction pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 165 1, to protect its jurisdiction
to hear their pending habeas petitions in the court of appeals, by requiring government offi-
cials to provide advance notice of the prisoners' proposed transfers to foreign countries. Id. at
73 ("[P]etitioners' motion [for a preliminary injunction is] denied ... [but the government
must] 'submit a declaration to this Court advising it of any transfers and certifying that any
such transfers ... [are] not made for the purpose of merely continuing the petitioners' deten-
tion on behalf of the United States or for the purpose of extinguishing this Court's jurisdiction
over petitioners' actions for habeas relief .... ); see also Ahmed v. Bush, No. 05-665(RWR),
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14024, at *5 (D.D.C. July 8, 2005) (ordering a protective condition
that detainee's attorney be given 30 days' notice prior to transfer); Abdah v. Bush, No. 04-
1254(HHK), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4942, at *24 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2005) (granting petition-
ers' request for a preliminary injunction preventing the United States from transferring peti-
tioners from the GBNB absent notice to and approval from the court).
9
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two years ... without access to counsel and without being charged [of
any crime] unquestionably describe[s] 'custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."'" 6 Additionally,
the Court suggested aliens could sue under the ATS for torts commit-
ted "in violation of the laws of nations or a treaty of the United
States."57
Nevertheless, these vague references to an alien's ability to sue
and the confirmation that the detainees' allegations are actionable do
not assure the viability of a civil suit brought for violation of a de-
tainee's rights. However, one fact is clear: after capturing foreign na-
tionals in connection with the attacks of 9-11, the United States has
held such detainees virtually incommunicado for periods of two or
more years without the opportunity to challenge their enemy combat-
ant status.58 Such treatment arguably constitutes prolonged arbitrary
detention and some detainees have already commenced suits for dam-
ages for this alleged rights violation. 9
Taking into account the length of time individuals have been de-
tained at the GBNB and the fact that there are no current plans to end
such detention, 6° serious thought must be given to how those who
might have been wrongfully detained or tortured can be compensated
by the U.S. government and other relevant actors. Jonathon Mahler
has argued that the "'war on terror' is, at its heart, a battle to show the
Islamic world that there is an alternative to oppressive.. . dictators,
[therefore,] nothing is more important than how the United States
government dispenses justice to [its] detainees .. .,,6 Failing to pro-
vide an adequate remedy for those detainees who have suffered rights
violations would thus undermine the "war on terror" and have serious
foreign policy implications. However, as Parts II-IV explain, the judi-
cial remedies that supposedly are available are ill suited to the task of
dispensing justice to foreign nationals detained at the GBNB.
56. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 n.15 (2004) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)
(2000)).
57. Id. at 485 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)).
58. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, supra note 13, at 2.
59. First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus In 2, 66, El-Banna v. Bush,
No.1:04-CV-011444 (D.D.C. July 8, 2004), available at http://www.ccr-ny.orglv2
/legalldocs/El-Banna%20First%2OAmended%2OPetition.pdf. Foreign nationals have re-
quested relief under the ATS for arbitrary arrest and detention. Id % 66.
60. McClellan, supra note 27.
61. Jonathon Mahler, The Bush Administration vs. Salim Hamdan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,
2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 44.
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III. FEDERAL TORTS CLAIMS ACT
"It is well established that 'the United States, as sovereign, is im-
mune from suit save as it consents to be sued.., and the terms of its
consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to enter-
tain the suit.' 62 The United States can therefore be made a defendant
in a civil suit for damages only by means of a "statutory cause of ac-
tion through which Congress has waived sovereign immunity. ' 63 En-
acted in 1946, the Federal Torts Claims Act provides the exclusive
means to sue any federal agency. 64 It provides:
[T]he district courts.., shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil ac-
tions on claims against the United States, for money damages, ac-
cruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property,
or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act
or omission of any employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances
where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred.65
Federal courts have consistently held that "a suit against the
United States under the FTCA is the exclusive remedy for tort claims
arising from. . . actions [by] government agencies or employees. 66
Further, the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensa-
tion Act of 198867 confers immunity on federal employees "by making
an FTCA action against the Government the exclusive remedy for
torts committed by [such] employees in the scope of their employ-
ment. 68
To establish a claim, a federal employee acting within the scope
of his employment must have engaged in negligent or wrongful con-
62. Schneider v. Kissinger, 310 F. Supp. 2d 251, 268 (D.D.C. 2004) (quoting United
States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)).
63. Floyd v. Dist. of D.C., 129 F.3d 152, 155 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
64. 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (2000); see also § 1346 (b)(1).
65. § 1346(b)(1) (2000).
66. Galvin v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 860 F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1988).
67. Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2000) and codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2674, 2679 (2000)).
68. United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 163 (1991). This act empowers the Attorney
General to certify that the employee "was acting within the scope of his office or employment
at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose . §..."  2679(d)(1). If certified, the
employee is dismissed from the action and the United States is substituted as defendant. Id.
20061 313
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duct.69 The wrongful conduct must be assessed pursuant to the "law
of the place where the act... occurred."" ° The GBNB is located in
Cuba. However, as the Supreme Court noted in Rasul, "[b]y the ex-
press terms of its agreements with Cuba, the United States exercises
complete jurisdiction and control over the [GBNB], and may continue
to [exercise such control] permanently if it [so] chooses."'" Therefore,
Cuba's laws are arguably not applicable at the GBNB, and any alleged
wrongful conduct occurring there must be determined according to
U.S. law.
A. Alleged Violations of U.S. Law for Purposes of a
"Wrongful Act" under the FTCA
One of the detainees' chief allegations is that their prolonged de-
tention has been arbitrary. When Rasul was decided in June 2004, the
vast majority of detainees at the GBNB had been confined for a period
of two years without being charged or having access to counsel or a
court proceeding.7 2 Such detention appears to be a violation of the
Fifth Amendment, which forbids the government to deprive "any per-
son ... of... liberty.., without due process of the law."73 The heart
of this guarantee protects against unlawful bodily restraint.74 Prison-
ers detained at the GBNB have been taken from various foreign coun-
tries far from the location of active hostilities in Afghanistan.75
Though the plurality in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld held that Congress's pas-
sage of the AUMF granted the President the power to detain enemy
combatants until the end of hostilities, it also limited its interpretation
of the AUMF to individuals actively engaged in armed conflict against
the United States in Afghanistan.76 Further, the Court expressly ac-
knowledged in Rasul:
69. § 1346(b)(1).
70. Id.
71. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 467-68 (2004).
72. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 447 (D.D.C. 2005).
73. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
74. E.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
75. See discussion supra note 14.
76. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion) ("We conclude
that detention of individuals falling into the limited category we are considering, [those fight-
ing against the United States in Afghanistan,] for the duration of the particular conflict in
which they were captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exer-
cise of the 'necessary and appropriate force' Congress has authorized the President to use.").
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Petitioners' allegations-that, although they have engaged neither
in combat nor in acts of terrorism against the United States, they
have been held in Executive detention for more than two years in
territory subject to the long-term, exclusive jurisdiction and control
of the United States, without access to counsel and without being
charged with any wrongdoing-unquestionably describe "custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States."77
Therefore, prolonged arbitrary detention would appear to consti-
tute the wrongful act required by the FTCA.78 The federal actors re-
sponsible would be President Bush,79 who issued the Detention Order
and the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, who detained indi-
viduals believed to be involved in the terrorist attacks of 9-11 pursuant
to the Order. 80 The detainee's allegations of torture could constitute a
second wrongful act under the FTCA as a "personal injury.., caused
by the... wrongful act... of any employee of the Government while
acting within the scope of his office or employment. '81 The relevant
government actors would include all federal employees conducting in-
terrogations of detainees at the GBNB. Both claims, however, may be
subject to statutory exceptions.
But see Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 393 (4th Cir. 2005). In addressing the capture of
Padilla on U.S. soil, the Padilla court rejected the contention Hamdi was so limited by stating:
When the plurality articulated the "narrow question" before it, it referred simply to
the permissibility of detaining "an individual who ... was part of or supporting
forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners" in Afghanistan and who
"engaged in an armed conflict against the United States" there.. . [n]owhere in its
framing of the "narrow question" presented did the plurality even mention the lo-
cus of capture.
Id.
77. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 n.15 (2004) (quoting 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(c)(3)
(West 2006)).
78. Applying U.S. law, since this alleged injury occurred at the GBNB, such claims
would be accessed by Fifth Amendment due process requirement. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 70-74.
79. The President is protected by "absolute immunity from damages liability" for his
official acts. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982).
80. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terror-
ism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57, 834 (Nov. 13, 2001).
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b)(1) (2000). Under U.S. federal law "'[tiorture' means an act
committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe
physical or mental pain or suffering ... upon another person within his custody or physical
control." 18 U.S.C.A § 2340 (West 2004).
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B. Exceptions to FTCA Statutory Relief
Though Congress provided a waiver of sovereign immunity by
making the U.S. government liable "in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, ' 82 it also
listed a number of exceptions in 28 U.S.C. section 2680 that deprive
the district courts of jurisdiction to hear such a case. 83 These excep-
tions to the FTCA, which could potentially prevent recovery for acts
of arbitrary detention and or torture suffered at the GBNB, include the
foreign country exception,' the discretionary duty exception,85 and the
exception for intentional torts.86 Ultimately, in light of established
precedent surrounding these exceptions, and the novelty of the situa-
tion posed by the detention of foreign nationals at the GBNB, it is
questionable whether an action under the FICA would succeed.
1. The Foreign Country Exception
The exception for "[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country" 87
erects the greatest barrier to recovering for damages suffered in Guan-
tanamo Bay, Cuba. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court
specifically addressed this exception when it discussed the civil reme-
dies available under U.S. law for extraterritorial torts by U.S. govern-
ment employees and their agents.88 In that case, employees of the
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) kidnapped Alvarez, a Mexican na-
tional, and forcibly transferred him to the United States to stand trial
for his alleged participation in the torture and death of a DEA agent.89
After Alvarez' acquittal, he filed suit under both the ATS and the
FTCA, naming the U.S. government as a defendant.90
Prior to Alvarez-Machain, the headquarters doctrine enabled a
claimant to bring a cause of action even if he or she suffered damages
in a foreign country.91 This doctrine allowed such claims under the
82. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2000).
83. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2000) for a complete description of these exceptions.
84. See id. § 2680(k).
85. See id. § 2680(a).
86. See id. § 2680(h).
87. See id. § 2680(k).
88. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 717-23 (2004).
89. Id. at 697-98.
90. Id. at 698.
91. Id. at 701.
14
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 36, No. 2 [2006], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol36/iss2/3
2006] CAN FOREIGN NATIONALS OBTAIN REDRESS?
FTCA so long as the injury suffered was a result of planning or a de-
cision made in the United States92 with "operative effect in another
country." 93 However, in Alvarez-Machain the Supreme Court invali-
dated this doctrine and held "the FrCA's foreign country exception
bars all claims based on any injury suffered in a foreign country, re-
gardless of where the tortious act or omission occurred." 94 Because
the detainees are seeking redress for injuries suffered in the foreign
country of Cuba, authority for which arose from the Detention Or-
der,95 which was issued in the U.S. but has "operative effect in another
country, '96 the use of the FICA thus seems problematic at best.
However, the Supreme Court's opinion in Rasul may provide an
alternative argument by analogy. Rasul allowed the reach of a habeas
corpus statute to extend to Guantanamo Bay97 because the United
States exercises "plenary and exclusive jurisdiction" over the area.98
Analogously, the reach of the FTCA could extend to this territory as
well.99 Moreover, the Court in Alvarez-Machain indicated that the
reason the foreign country exception was included in the FICA was to
avoid applying a foreign law against the United States."°° Since U.S.
law is applied at the GBNB, allowing such claims to proceed would
not be inconsistent with Congress's rationale for the application of this
exception.
92. See generally id at 701-10.
93. Id. at 701 (quoting Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
94. 542 U.S. at 712 (emphasis added).
95. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terror-
ism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57, 834 (Nov. 13, 2001).
96. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 701.
97. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481 (2004) ("Aliens held at the base, no less than
American citizens, are entitled to invoke the federal courts' authority under § 2241.").
98. Id. at 466; see also Lease Agreement, supra note 3.
99. Indeed, one district court has already concluded that constitutional rights should be
so extended, "In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Rasul, it is clear that Guantanamo
Bay must be considered the equivalent of a U.S. territory in which fundamental constitutional
rights apply." In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 464 (D.D.C. 2005).
See also Rasul, 542 U.S. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Guantanamo Bay is in every
practical respect a United States territory, and it is one far removed from any hostilities.
... [The Guantanamo Bay lease] is no ordinary lease. Its term is indefinite and at the discre-
tion of the United States. What matters is the unchallenged and indefinite control that the
United States has long exercised over Guantanamo Bay. [T]he indefinite lease of Guan-
tanamo Bay has produced a place that belongs to the United States, extending the 'implied
protection' of the United States to it.").
100. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 707. "[T]he current text of the foreign
country exception .. . codified Congress's 'unwilling[ness] to subject the United States to li-
abilities depending upon the laws of a foreign power."' Id. (quoting United States v. Spelar,
338 U.S. 217, 221 (1949)).
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Nevertheless, arguing for an extension of the FTCA to the terri-
tory of the GBNB based on Rasul is untenable. The habeas statute in
Rasul reached the GBNB because it provided for extension of the writ
to prisoners in the custody and control of the United States. 0' The
FTCA, however, explicitly exempts harms arising in a foreign coun-
try, leaving considerably less room for extension.'0 2 Additionally, as
noted in Rasul, "Under the [Lease] Agreement, 'the United States rec-
ognizes the continuance of the ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of
Cuba over the [leased areas]."" 3 Even if U.S. law does apply in this
portion of Cuban territory, the GBNB cannot be considered a sover-
eign territory of the United States. The fact the United States does not
exercise ultimate sovereignty over the GBNB is likely to be crucial in
determining that the harms occurred in a foreign country for the pur-
poses of the FTCA. Furthermore, in Alvarez-Machain the Court ex-
plicitly rejected a selective application of the headquarters doctrine
even when the state's choice of law would not dictate the application
of a foreign law based on location of injury."°4 The Court reasoned
that Congress would not have intended such "jurisdictional variety."' 05
Given that Rasul dealt with a statutory entitlement with no geographi-
cal exclusions,"° and the express terms of the Lease Agreement rec-
ognize the continuing ultimate sovereignty of Cuba over the leased ar-
eas, 1 7 it is likely that the foreign country exception applies to the
GBNB.
2. The Exception for Intentional Torts
In addition to excluding acts committed in foreign countries, the
FTCA also excludes most intentional torts, including false imprison-
101. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(c)(1) (West 2006); see also Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484 ("No
party questions the District Court's jurisdiction over petitioners' custodians ... [therefore] §
2241 confers on the District Court jurisdiction to hear petitioners' habeas corpus challenges to
the legality of their detention ....").
102. Courts are more apt to find jurisdiction when there are serious deprivations of lib-
erty at issue, rather than an after-the-fact claim for compensation.
103. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 471 (quoting Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations,
U.S.-Cuba, Feb. 23, 1903, T.S. No. 418).
104. See Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 711-12 ("The idea that Congress would have
intended any such jurisdictional variety is too implausible to drive the analysis to the point of
grafting even a selective headquarters exception onto the foreign country exception itself.").
105. Id. at 712.
106. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (West 2006).
107. See Lease Agreement, supra note 3.
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ment, false arrest, and abuse of process.108 However, this section was
amended in 1974 to allow such actions against "investigative or law
enforcement officers of the United States Government."' 9 Since the
President authorized the detention"0 and the Secretary of Defense and
soldiers carried it out, the intentional torts exception will likely also
bar suits for claims of prolonged arbitrary detention. However, de-
tainees may be more successful in pursuing a claim for torture against
their interrogators. Although the military personnel who interrogated
Guantanamo detainees may not fit within the definition of an "investi-
gative or law enforcement officer," ' 1 detainees were also interrogated
by members of the FBI who do fit within the definition."12 Neverthe-
less, this claim will present difficult factual hurdles examined be-
low.11 3 Additionally, the foreign country exception remains a problem
because the interrogations occurred at the GBNB, rather than on the
sovereign territory of the United States.
3. The Discretionary Duties Exception
A final obstacle to detainees being able to assert a claim for pro-
longed arbitrary detention under the FCTA concerns the discretionary
duty exception. This exception exempts:
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or
regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the dis-
cretion involved be abused. 114
The Detention Order issued by President Bush was discretionary
in nature and by its very terms, authorized the Secretary of Defense to
detain anyone the President had reason to believe was a member of al
108. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2000).
109. Id. Such officers are defined as "any officer of the United States who is empow-
ered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal
law." Id.
110. See discussion supra Part I.
111. Such personnel presumably do not have the power to "execute searches, to seize
evidence, or to make arrests." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2000).
112. See TIroN REPORT, supra note 1, 202, 228.
113. See discussion infra Part IV.2.
114. § 2680(a).
2006] 319
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Qaeda or either participated, aided, or harbored individuals involved
in acts of terrorism against the United States." 5 This exception will
thus prevent claims for arbitrary detention. However, it may not bar
allegations of torture. Assuming the interrogators fall within the defi-
nition of an "investigative or law enforcement officer,"' 1 6 and that de-
tainees can surmount the factual obstacles necessary to prove their al-
legations of torture,'17 federal officials might claim that their job as
interrogators is discretionary in nature. That is, interrogators may ar-
gue their job was to obtain information about national security, and
the means by which they retrieved this information involved the use of
their discretion. This argument appears unsound because an absolute
prohibition on torture exists under U.S. law." 8 Furthermore, current
treaty obligations of the United States prohibit such human rights vio-
lations." 9 Consequently, there is clearly no discretion to torture and a
claim for torture might succeed, as long as the foreign country excep-
tion does not preclude recovery.
4. Conclusion Regarding the FTCA
Although the creation of the FTCA has made suits against the
U.S. government possible, its application is clearly limited, especially
when seeking redress for harms occurring outside the United States.
Even if one could surpass the foreign country exception for the pur-
poses of an arbitrary detention claim, the intentional tort and discre-
tionary duty exceptions appear to pose an insurmountable barrier. In
pursuing a torture claim, great obstacles lie in the way of gathering the
factual evidence necessary to prove the elements of the claim. 20 Fac-
tual hurdles aside, if one can overcome the foreign country exception,
it does not appear any other exception would stand in the way of pur-
suing this claim. However, given that any waiver of immunity of the
United States by Congress is strictly construed and "cannot be ex-
115. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Ter-
rorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57, 834 (Nov. 13, 2001).
116. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
117. See discussion infra Part IV.2.
118. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (West 2001).
119. See generally Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter CAT].
120. See discussion infra Part IV.2.
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tended beyond the plain language of the statute[,]"' 2 1 an argument
based on the opinion of Rasul, asserting that the GBNB should not be
treated as a foreign country, would likely fail. 122 Such failure is even
more likely considering the narrowing of the FTCA in Alvarez-
Machain by the elimination of the headquarters doctrine. 123  There-
fore, it is not likely that that the FCTA will adequately address harms
suffered at the GBNB.
IV. ALIEN TORT STATUTE
Another possible source of redress for these claims is the ATS,
which provides, "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."124 A federal dis-
trict court will have jurisdiction under the ATS if: (1) the claim is
made by an alien; (2) for tort; and (3) the tort is in violation of the law
of nations or treaty of the United States. l'5 Although enacted in
1789,126 the ATS was virtually unused until a landmark case in 1980
allowed a Paraguayan torture victim to use the U.S. federal courts to
sue his alleged torturer, who was a Paraguayan national. 127 Since then,
the statute has been invoked by numerous foreign nationals seeking
compensation for human rights violations committed abroad 128 and has
121. Price v. United States, 174 U.S. 373, 376 (1899).
122. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
123. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 711-12 (2004). Alvarez-Machain was
notably decided the same day the Supreme Court held that district courts had jurisdiction to
hear foreign national detainees' habeas corpus petitions in Rasul, possibly anticipating the
filing of suits on behalf of detainees, as it appears the headquarters doctrine would have been
otherwise applicable to allegations of abuse. See discussion supra Part IH.B. 1.
124. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §1350 (2000).
125. Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542, 545 (D.D.C. 1981),
affid, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
126. Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20,
§ 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)).
127. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878, 887 (2d Cir. 1980).
128. See Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1377 (9th Cir. 1998) (Mexi-
can citizen and his wife sued Los Angeles "for arbitrary arrest and detention, a violation of
the law of nations, under the [ATS]"); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 244 (2d Cir. 1995)
(concluding alleged war crimes, genocide, torture, and other atrocities committed by a Bos-
nian Serb leader were actionable under the ATS); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human
Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 495 (9th Cir. 1992) (Philippine citizen brought a suit under the
ATS against former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos for the alleged torture and wrong-
ful death of her son); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d
289, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (suit filed against defendant oil company alleging it collaborated
with Sudan "to commit gross human rights violations, including extrajudicial killing, forcible
19
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played a leading role in the international effort to hold accountable
those who violate internationally recognized human rights. But can
the ATS hold the U.S. government accountable for similar violations,
or is it simply a mechanism by which America seeks to hold others
accountable, while granting its own officials immunity?
A. The "Law of Nations"
There are two main obstacles detainees must overcome in order to
utilize the ATS. First, they must identify a "law of nations" that has
been violated. 2 9 Second, they must name a defendant who is not pro-
tected by immunity. 131 Prior to Alvarez-Machain, courts disagreed on
how to define and locate the "law of nations."'' 31 Alvarez-Machain
settled the law in one respect, holding that claims that violate the "law
of nations" are not restricted to the set of international norms that ex-
isted at the time the ATS was enacted in 1789.132 In ascertaining the
modern law of nations, the Court instructed, "[C]ourts should require
any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined
with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century para-
digms we have recognized."' 133
displacement, war crimes, confiscation and destruction of property, kidnapping, rape, and en-
slavement").
129. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876-86 (stating that substantive principles to be applied
in ATS litigation are to be ascertained by looking to international law). Valid sources for dis-
cerning what constitutes international law are the customs and usages of civilized nations, ju-
dicial opinions, and the works of jurists. Id. at 880-81.
130. See Murray v. United States, 686 F.2d 1320, 1325 (8th Cir. 1982). A waiver of
sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed, and "should be sought in the statute
giving rise to [the] cause of action." Id.
131. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Edwards, J., concurring) ("[Vliolations of the 'law of nations' under section 1350 are not
limited to Blackstone's enumerated offenses."); Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 888 (jurisdiction is ex-
tended to "well-established, universally recognized norms of international law"). But see Tel-
Oren, 726 F.2d at 813-14 (Bork, J., concurring) (asserting that jurisdiction under the ATS
should be limited to violations of international law available in 1789, as articulated by Black-
stone, such as violation of safe-conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and pi-
racy).
132. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724-25.
133. Id. at 725; see also In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d
1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994). A claim is actionable under the ATS when the violation alleged
is of a "norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory." Id.
20
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B. Actionable Violations Alleged by Guantanamo Bay Detainees
Detainees assert torture and prolonged arbitrary detention claims,
both of which present their own obstacles to utilizing the ATS as a
means of recovery. Factually, proving the allegations of prolonged
arbitrary detention will be more straightforward than that of torture.
Legally, however, it will be easier to establish that there is an interna-
tional norm against torture, whereas prolonged detention has not
clearly become customary international law.
1. Arbitrary Detention
When Rasul was decided, 650 foreign nationals were being held
at the GBNB pursuant to the President's Detention Order.134 At that
time, only two individuals had been formally charged with an of-
fense. 13 5 These facts clearly indicate that the detainees have been sub-
jected to prolonged detention. The detention is arbitrary based on the
facts conceded by the government in Rasul: detainees were held in
military custody for a period of two years or more, without formal
charges, a hearing, or access to counsel. 3 6 Still, proving a claim of
arbitrary detention also requires that there be an international norm
against it that qualifies as a "law of nations" under the ATS. In Alva-
rez-Machain, the Court unanimously excluded arbitrary arrest and
non-prolonged arbitrary detention as viable claims under the ATS. 137
However, this decision was confined to the particularly broad defini-
tion of arbitrary detention presented by Alvarez, 138 which is clearly
distinguishable from the kind of arbitrary detention involved at the
GBNB.
Alvarez deemed his detention arbitrary because the DEA agents
who captured him in Mexico had no extraterritorial authority to arrest
him outside U.S. jurisdiction, and therefore no applicable law author-
ized his arrest and subsequent detention. 1 The Court described Alva-
134. Brief for the Respondents at 6, Rasul v. Bush, Nos. 03-334, 03-343 (2004); see
also Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism,
66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57, 834 (Nov. 13, 2001)
135. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 134, at 7. The offense was conspiracy to
commit war crimes. Id.
136. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, supra note 13, at 2.
137. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 737-38.
138. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
139. 542 U.S. at 735-36.
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rez's claim as an "officially sanctioned action exceeding positive au-
thorization to detain under the domestic law of some government, re-
gardless of the circumstances." 14 While the majority concluded that
additional causes of action could be recognized under the "law of na-
tions," besides those that existed at the time the ATS was enacted,14 1
the Court nevertheless held that "a single illegal detention of less than
a day, followed by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a
prompt arraignment, violates no norm of customary international law
so well defined as to support the creation of a federal remedy." 142 In
response to the Ninth Circuit's finding of an international norm
against arbitrary detention, 143 the Supreme Court characterized Alva-
rez's claim as "so broad" that its "implications would be breathtak-
ing," concluding "it expresses an aspiration that exceeds any binding
customary rule having the specificity we require... [and] would go
beyond any residual common law discretion we think it appropriate to
exercise." 144 Despite the Supreme Court's failure to recognize Alva-
rez's arbitrary detention claim as violating a "law of nations," such a
claim may nevertheless be recognized in the context of detention at
the GBNB, a kind of detention that can be readily distinguished from
Alvarez's "single illegal detention of less than a day." 141
Nevertheless, it remains uncertain whether prolonged arbitrary de-
tention violates established international norms, despite the findings of
the American Law Institute (ALI) and case law. In 1987, the ALI set
out the then-current list of customary human rights norms, which in-
cluded "prolonged arbitrary detention."'" The ALI's Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Restate-
ment) defined detention as arbitrary if it "is not pursuant to law," or if
it "'is incompatible with the principles of justice or with the dignity of
the human person,"' and stated, "[A]rbitrary detention violates cus-
140. Id. at 736.
141. See id. at 729.
142. Id. at 738.
143. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 620 (9th Cir. 2003) (majority
opinion) (holding "there exists a clear and universally recognized norm prohibiting arbitrary
arrest and detention"). The court rejected any element of "prolonged" detention, "as the lan-
guage of the international instruments demonstrates, the norm is universally cited as one
against 'arbitrary' detention and does not include a temporal element." Id. at 621.
144. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 736, 738.
145. Id. at 738.
146. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
702(e) (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
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tomary law if it is prolonged and practiced as state policy." '147 Noting
that the Restatement did not define "state policy" and "prolonged" de-
tention, the Court in Alvarez-Machain neither disagreed with the ALI
definition nor denied that such detention had the status of customary
international law. 48 The Court only rejected its application to Alva-
rez-Machain.'49 The Court stated, "Any credible invocation of a prin-
ciple against arbitrary detention that the civilized world accepts as
binding customary international law requires a factual basis beyond
relatively brief detention in excess of positive authority."' 5 ° Although
the detainee's detention at the GBNB is pursuant to law,'5' it may very
well be "incompatible with the principles of justice or with the dignity
of the human person."' 52 The Restatement suggests that "[d]etention
is arbitrary if it... is not accompanied by notice of charges; if the per-
son detained is not given early opportunity to communicate with fam-
ily or to consult counsel; or is not brought to trial within a reasonable
time."' 53 Unlike Alvarez's illegal detention of less than one day, "fol-
lowed by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt ar-
raignment,"'154 the situation of detainees falls squarely within the Re-
statement definition of arbitrary detention. 155 In addition, several U.S.
cases have recognized arbitrary detention as prohibited under custom-
ary international law.'56 For more than thirty years, some U.S. courts
have considered prolonged arbitrary detention as an actionable viola-
147. Id. § 702 cmt. h (quoting Statement of U.S. Delegation, 13 GAOR, U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/SR.863 at 137 (1958)).
148. See Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 737.
149. See id. at 737-38.
150. Id. at 737.
151. See Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
152. RESTATEMENT, supra note 146, § 702 cmt. h (quoting Statement of U.S. Delega-
tion, 13 GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.863 at 137 (1958)).
153. Id. § 702 cmt. h.
154. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 738.
155. See supra Part H.
156. See Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1384 (9th Cir. 1998) (recog-
nizing a "clear international prohibition against arbitrary arrest and detention"); Hilao v. Es-
tate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789, 795 (9th Cir. 1996) (recognizing arbitrary detention as an ac-
tionable violation of international law, describing it as "detention of a person in an official
detention facility.., without any notice of the charges and failure to bring to trial that person
within a reasonable time"); De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1397
(5th Cir. 1985) (recognizing a right not to be arbitrarily detained as a law of nations); Xuncax
v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 169, 185 (D. Mass. 1995) (deeming torture, summary execu-
tion, disappearance, and arbitrary detention by Guatemalan military actionable violations un-
der the ATS).
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tion of international law.1"7 Considering the duration of the detention
at the GBNB without any type of hearing, it is likely that this deten-
tion, therefore, constitutes a readily actionable violation of the "law of
nations" under the ATS.15 8
However, despite the apparent status of a prohibition on pro-
longed arbitrary detention as customary international law, the Su-
preme Court has indicated reluctance to recognize new causes of ac-
tion under the ATS without prior congressional action.'59 The
Alvarez-Machain Court urged judicial caution when considering new
claims under the "law of nations," instructing courts to look for "legis-
lative guidance before exercising innovative authority over substan-
tive law" and stressing the potential danger to foreign relations when
international rules are made privately actionable. 16° The Supreme
Court's strong hesitation to recognize additional claims in the absence
of congressional action 161 creates uncertainty as to whether prolonged
arbitrary detention would be actionable under the ATS regardless of
its status as a "law of nations."
2. Torture
In contrast to the claim of prolonged arbitrary detention, the pro-
hibition against torture has been well established as customary inter-
national law since the 1980 decision of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.162 The
Supreme Court affirmed this fact in Alvarez-Machain, where it indi-
157. See Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194, 1201-02 n.13 (9th Cir. 1975)
(stating illegal arrest and detention may constitute a violation of the law of nations).
158. Other law review articles examining the Alvarez-Machain decision have reached
similar conclusions. See, e.g., Sandra Coliver et. al., Holding Human Rights Violators Ac-
countable by Using International Law in U.S. Courts: Advocacy Efforts and Complementary
Strategies, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 169, 171 (2005) ("Although the Court denied the particu-
lar arbitrary arrest claim advanced by Dr. Alvarez, it did so in a manner that does not appear
to undermine the prior case law in which claims of ... prolonged arbitrary detention were
found actionable under the ATS.").
159. See Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 727.
160. Id. at 726-27.
161. The Supreme Court noted that Congress did take some limited and specific action
by adding the Torture Victims Protection Act to the ATS, which was passed partially to re-
spond to the judicial concern that Congress had never made clear its desire that federal courts
hear cases alleging torture carried out under the authority of a foreign government. Id. at 728;
see also H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 3-4 (1991).
162. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) ("We hold that delib-
erate torture perpetrated under color of official authority violates universally accepted norms
of the international law of human rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties.").
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cated that the Torture Victims Protection Act 163 (TVPA) was added to
the ATS to fulfill U.S. treaty obligations and "'establish[es] an unam-
biguous and modern basis for' federal claims of torture and extrajudi-
cial killing.' However, the difficulty in pursuing a torture claim is
proving the necessary factual elements of torture. The TVPA defines
torture as:
[A]ny act, directed against an individual in the offender's custody
or physical control, by which severe pain or suffering, . . . whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on that individual for
such purposes as obtaining.., personal information or a confes-
sion, punishing that individual or an act... committed or is sus-
pected of having committed, intimidating or coercing that individ-
ual or a third person .... 65
Further, the TVPA defines mental pain or suffering as:
[P]rolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from the inten-
tional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or
suffering; the administration or application, or threatened admini-
stration or application, of mind altering substances or other proce-
dures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality;
the threat of imminent death; or the threat that another individual
will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suf-
fering .... 166
It is important to note that it is not simply the infliction of pain
and suffering that is prohibited as torture, but only severe pain and
suffering. Scholars have noted the great potential for disagreement as
to what constitutes "the relevant measure of severity and from whose
perspective it should be judged." 167  Therefore, a detainee bears the
burden of demonstrating both the the conduct was prolonged and that
the severity of the conduct amounted to torture. In addition, there re-
163. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)).
164. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 728 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 3 (1991)).
165. Pub. L. No. 102-256. This definition is reiterated in the United States' understand-
ing regarding CAT's definition of torture. CAT, supra note 119, art. 1.
166. Pub. L. No. 102-256 (emphasis added).
167. Sanford Levinson, "Precommitment" and "Postcommitment": The Ban on Torture
in the Wake of September 11, 81 TEx. L. REv. 2013, 2038 (2003) (discussing the difficulties of
proving torture). "Moreover, the addition by the United States of a requirement that mental
harm be 'prolonged' also offers more than enough opportunity for such apologists to deny
that some act constituted 'torture' because the mental harm lasted 'only' a week or a month,
or three months .... " Id.
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mains an additional obstacle: the TVPA cannot be used when the tor-
ture was conducted at the direction of a U.S. official.
C. The Unavailability of the TVPA as a Civil Remedy for
Guantanamo Detainees
Generally, the FTCA is the exclusive mechanism by which the
government and its employees may be sued for torts. 168 However, the
TVPA also can be used to sue a federal employee. The FTCA pro-
vides that the United States cannot be substituted in as the defendant
when an action is brought "for a violation of a statute.., under which
such action against an individual is otherwise authorized." 169 Because
the TVPA authorizes actions against individuals, it qualifies as a stat-
ute exempt from the exclusiveness of remedy provision of the
FTCA. 17 ° Therefore, a federal employee cannot use the FrCA as a
shield to avoid liability for torture.
Nevertheless, a larger difficulty remains: the TVPA imposes civil
liability only on an individual acting "under actual or apparent author-
ity, or color of law, of any foreign nation."'7' Thus, the statute ex-
empts actions undertaken at the direction of the United States.'72
Therefore, foreign nationals cannot use the TVPA to obtain a remedy
for torture suffered at the direction of the U.S. government. Assuming
violations for prolonged arbitrary detention and torture can be estab-
lished as actionable violations of the "law of nations," it may still be
possible to sue the United States under ATS.
168. Galvin v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 860 F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cit.
1988). See generally discussion supra Part III.
169. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(B) (2000). See generally discussion supra Part III.B.3.
170. See Schneider v. Kissinger, 310 F. Supp. 2d 251, 267 (D.D.C. 2004) ("[A] viola-
tion of the TVPA arguably fulfills the requirements of § 2679(b)(2)(B)."), af'd, 412 F.3d 190
(D.C. Cir. 2005).
171. Pub. L. No. 102-256 (emphasis added).
172. The TVPA was designed to allow "suits against individuals, but not governments,
who engage in or, under certain circumstances, permit their subordinates to engage in torture
... in foreign countries" and then travel to the United States. Rachael E. Schwartz, Note,
"And Tomorrow?" The Torture Victim Protection Act, 11 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 271, 275
(1994).
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D. The United States as a Defendant
It is uncertain whether the ATS can be used to sue the U.S. gov-
ernment.7 3 The United States is sovereign, and therefore, immune to
suits unless it consents to be sued.'74 Any waiver of "sovereign im-
munity must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text."'75 Since
the ATS contains no such language, it would appear a foreign national
cannot maintain a cause of action against the federal government un-
der it. Nevertheless, it is important to review Rasul, which addressed
an alien's ability to pursue litigation in U.S. federal courts.
In addition to requesting relief under the federal habeas statute,
the detainees in Rasul "sued for injunctions and declaratory judgments
under the [ATS] ... alleging that the United States is confining them
in violation of treaties and international law."' 76 Previously, the D.C.
Circuit stated that the Supreme Court had held that "'the privilege of
litigation' does not extend to aliens in military custody who have no
presence in 'any territory over which the United States is sover-
eign."" 77  The D.C. Circuit therefore surmised that the Supreme
Court's holding "doom[ed] these additional causes of action, even if
they deal only with conditions of confinement and do not sound in ha-
beas .... [Detainees] cannot seek release based on violations of the
Constitution or treaties or federal law; the courts are not open to
them." 17 8
However, in Rasul the Supreme Court disagreed and held that
nothing "categorically excludes aliens detained in military custody
outside the United States from the 'privilege of litigation' in U.S.
courts."'7 9 The Court noted that U.S. courts have traditionally been
available to non-resident aliens, and the ATS explicitly conferred such
a litigation right upon them.180 It also stated that the fact that the de-
173. However, it is clear that foreign governments can be sued under the ATS as long
as such suits comply with the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act Liu v. Republic of China, 892
F.2d 1419, 1424 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that claims against foreign states must fall within
listed exception to Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act).
174. Schneider v. Kissinger, 310 F. Supp. 2d 251, 268 (citing United States v. Sher-
wood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)).
175. Floyd v. District of Colombia, 129 F.3d 152, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
176. Khaled v. Al Odah, 321 F.3d 1134, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom Rasul v.
Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
177. Id. at 1144 (quoting Johnson v, Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777-78 (1950)).
178. Id. at 1144-45.
179. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004) (citing Al Odah, 321 F.3d. at 1139).
180. Id. at 484-85.
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tainees were in military custody was "immaterial to the question of the
District Court's jurisdiction over their non-habeas statutory claims."''
Although Rasul affirms that federal courts generally have jurisdic-
tion to hear claims traditionally brought by aliens under the ATS,18 2 it
does not hold that the ATS provides an avenue for suing the federal
government.'83 The Court notably failed to overrule prior cases to the
extent they held that the ATS was not itself a waiver of sovereign im-
munity. s'4 Suits traditionally brought by aliens under the ATS have
not included claims against the United States, and therefore, if the Su-
preme Court had intended to expand the liability of the U.S. govern-
ment under the ATS, it would have done so explicitly. 185 The exclu-
sivity clause of the FTCA also implies that the ATS does not create a
181. Id. at 485.
182. Id.
183. Nevertheless, the Center for Constitutional Rights has brought claims against U.S.
officials under the ATS in Turkmen v. Ashcroft. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition
to Motion of the United States to be Substituted as Defendant at 8-10, Turkmen v. Ashcroft,
No. 02-CV-2307 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2005), available at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/
september l1th/docs/WestfallAct briefFINAL.pdf. Although this case was brought for
harms occurring in a New York detention center, plaintiffs alleged violations both of their
right to contact their foreign consulate and of customary international prohibitions against ar-
bitrary detention and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. See id. at 1-5. The government
argued 28 U.S.C. section 2679(d)(1) of the FTCA conferred immunity on federal officials by
making an FTCA action against the government the exclusive remedy for any alleged torts
committed by such employees in the scope of their employment. See id. at 1, 5-10. Plaintiffs
contend this statute does not apply because their claims under the ATS exempt from the
FTCA's exclusivity clause. See id. at 1, 8-10; see also Complaint, Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 414 F.
Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2006) (No. 04 Civ. 01864), 2004 WL 2878175 (the first action for dam-
ages brought against U.S. officials on behalf of released GBNB detainees, alleging prolonged
arbitrary detention and torture). But see Schneider v. Kissinger, 310 F. Supp. 2d 251, 267
(D.D.C. 2004) (holding the ATS "itself cannot be violated for purposes of [28 U.S.C.] §
2679(b)(2)(B)," the section of the FTCA which allows other suits to proceed against the gov-
ernment when another statute otherwise authorizes the action (such as the TVPA)), aff'd, 412
F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
184. See Sanchez v. Regan, 770 F.2d 202, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Can. Transp. Co. v.
United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
185. See generally Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). The Court dis-
cussed the law of nations "as a body of judge-made law regulating the conduct of individuals
situated outside domestic boundaries and consequently carrying an international savor." Id at
715 (emphasis added). The ATS was originally enacted to address the following: "law of na-
tions"; "violation of safe conducts"; "infringement of the rights of ambassadors"; and "pi-
racy." Id. The Court stated that each of these offenses contemplate actions by private indi-
viduals that could have "threatening serious consequences in international affairs" and
possibly lead to war if not addressed. Id. (emphasis added). Nowhere in the Court's discus-
sion of these violations did it mention actions taken by government officials. See generally
id. at 712-24.
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cause of action for wrongs committed by government employees. 18 6
In addition, it is established doctrine that in the absence of an apparent
remedy for an injury caused by an act or omission of the United
States, a remedy may not be supplied by an implied waiver of sover-
eign immunity.' A waiver of sovereign immunity must be un-
equivocally expressed, and "should be sought in the statute giving rise
to [the] cause of action."' 8 8 Moreover, courts have repeatedly stated
that the ATS is not a waiver of sovereign immunity and does not au-
thorize suits against the United States.'8 9 Therefore, in its current
state, the ATS does not appear to provide a solid basis for a cause of
action against the U.S. government.
E. Guantanamo Bay Detainees' Suits Against Private Individuals and
Corporations Under the ATS
Assuming federal officials cannot be sued under the ATS because
they are protected from liability, detainees may nevertheless be able to
identify a non-state actor to hold responsible. In Kadic v. Karadzic,
the reach of the ATS was expanded to private parties for certain inter-
national human rights claims. 190 This expansion opened the door to
corporate accountability, and the first such lawsuit was filed in 1996
in Doe v. Unocal. '9' Without the ability to sue the direct perpetrators,
186. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(a) (2000); see also Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 631-32. In Al-
varez-Machain, the Ninth Circuit found the district court properly substituted the United
States for individual government defendants in a lawsuit filed by a Mexican national under
the ATS. Id. The court's rationale was the ATS does not fall within the exception of 28
U.S.C. section 2679(b)(2)(B), which states the exclusiveness provision does not apply when
another statute otherwise authorizes the action, since the ATS creates no obligations or duties.
Id. But see supra text accompanying note 185. Regardless of this holding, plaintiffs' brief in
Turkman v. Rumsfeld argues that ATS claims are statutory exceptions to the FTCA. Plain-
tiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion of the United States to be Substituted as Defen-
dant, supra note 183, at 8-10.
187. Murray v. United States, 686 F.2d 1320, 1325 (8th Cir. 1982).
188. Id.
189. See Goldstar (Pan.) S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968 (4th Cir. 1992);
Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1333 n.4 (9th Cir. 1992); Can. Transp., 663 F.2d at
1092.
190. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241-44 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying certain norms
proscribing genocide, war crimes, summary execution, rape, and other forms of torture com-
mitted in pursuit of these crimes, to private (i.e., non-state) actors under international law and
finding these norms can be the basis for an ATS claim).
191. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 883 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff'd in part,
395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), and rev'd in part, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002). In that case,
plaintiffs alleged that Unocal hired the Burmese military to provide security and other support
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such as federal government actors, detainees could try to sue a corpo-
ration by proving it was an accomplice, aider and abettor, or co-
conspirator. 1
92
Corporations have been sued both for their direct involvement in
human rights violations, such as destructive environmental prac-
tices, 93 and for their complicity in the human rights violations of gov-
ernment officials and soldiers.194 In the latter case, plaintiffs seek to
hold corporations liable for the actions of governmental or private
third parties, alleging that the corporations either caused plaintiffs' in-
juries or are vicariously liable because of their participation in a joint
venture. 95 The Ninth Circuit stated that a corporate defendant can be
found liable if it provides "knowing practical assistance or encour-
agement [that] has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the
crime," which requires actual or constructive knowledge. 196
For claims of torture, detainees would have to identify a non-
governmental body involved in the provision or training of the inter-
rogators that allegedly committed the torture at the GBNB. Such a
suit has already been brought on behalf of prisoners who were held in
Iraqi prisons under U.S. control, alleging that Titan Corporation con-
spired with the United States to torture them.'97 For the claims of arbi-
trary detention, the detainees could sue the construction companies
that built and expanded the GBNB detention facility, alleging that
they aided the United States in its violation of the international prohi-
bition against prolonged arbitrary detention.
Since litigation on corporate liability is relatively new, it is un-
clear if such suits are likely to succeed. However, corporations have
deep pockets, and a successful suit may provide detainees compensa-
for a pipeline project, knowing that the military had a long record of violent human rights
abuses. Id.
192. See Burnett v. A] Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 86, 91, 100 (D.D.C.
2003); see also Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
193. Jota v. Texaco Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 155-56 (2d Cir. 1998) (seeking damages under
the ATS for environmental and personal injuries allegedly caused by Texaco's dumping of
toxic byproducts into local rivers, as well as equitable relief to remedy the resulting property
contamination).
194. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 891.
195. See id.
196. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 951 (9th Cir. 2002), reh'g en banc, 403 F.3d
708 (9th Cir. 2005). The parties settled in 2004. See Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d at 708.
197. See Saleh v. Titan Corp., 361 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1152 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (granting
the corporations' motion to transfer the detainees' action to the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia). As of the date of this publication, no decision has been rendered
on the merits of this case.
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tion. Furthermore, a successful suit would deter corporations from
contracting to do what the government cannot legally do itself. How-
ever, these suits do not fulfill the goal of accountability. Although
corporations may be to blame for their complicity in human rights
abuses, it is the U.S. government that has employed them to do its
dirty work. Corporations are only poor substitutes for the real wrong-
doers. Pursuing claims against corporations simply deflects responsi-
bility away from the U.S. government.
While the ATS prevents the United States from becoming a safe
haven for human rights abusers, it also insulates the United States
from accountability for its own human rights abuses. In seeking to
provide alien victims of human rights abuses with a forum where they
can obtain reparation for human rights violations, it defies logic for
the United States to exempt itself from that very same process. The
ATS has made an important contribution to deterring human rights
violations, by preventing foreigners from committing human rights
violations abroad and then fleeing to the United States. But there is no
such deterrence for U.S. officials, who can commit human rights vio-
lations abroad and then return home with impunity. The ATS is an in-
effective mechanism for holding U.S. government actors accountable
for the abuses occurring in Guantanamo Bay.
V. UTILIZING A BIVENS ACTION
The Supreme Court has generated another possible method to re-
dress these abuses. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the Court created a cause of action
against federal agents in their individual capacities for constitutional
law violations committed while acting under the color of the law.' 98
The Bivens Court held that an unconstitutional search and seizure by
federal drug officers implied an individual cause of action not ex-
pressly provided in the Fourth Amendment."9 Bivens actions were
subsequently extended to violations of the Fifth Amendment's due
198. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
389 (1971). This case cannot be used as authority to sue the federal government. See id.
Though no statute exists for this cause of action, the right to recover nevertheless exists as a
judicially-created cause of action. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980).
199. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 391-92.
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process guarantee,2tu as well violations of the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.2 °
To be able to pursue the constitutional remedy created in Bivens,
detainees must possess substantive constitutional rights. °2  Though
the Supreme Court in Rasul gave jurisdiction to federal courts to hear
petitions for writs of habeas corpus, the Court did not explicitly de-
termine what substantive rights are due to detainees.2 °3 Assuming de-
tainees have substantive constitutional rights, it is necessary to access
what constitutional right violations they have suffered. 2°  Detainees
could raise both a Fifth Amendment due process claim regarding their
prolonged arbitrary detention 25 and an Eighth Amendment cruel and
unusual punishment claim regarding torture. 206 However, Bivens only
provides a remedy against individual government employees or agents
for unconstitutional conduct, rendering a Fifth Amendment due proc-
200. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 229(1979).
201. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16-18 (1980).
202. Whether the GBNB detainees have substantive constitutional rights is uncertain.
See supra Part II; cf Gerald L. Neuman, Closing the Guantanamo Loophole, 50 Loy. L. REv.
1, 40 (2004) ("The highly unusual character of the U.S.' jurisdiction and control over [the
Guantanamo Base],. . . compels the conclusion that the [U.S.] Constitution applies [there] in
the same fashion as to other territor[ies,] [such as the Canal Zone, the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands, and the American sector in Berlin,] where the [United States] is not sovereign
but possesses complete jurisdiction and control."). But see Leah E. Kraft, The Judiciary's
Opportunity to Protect International Human Rights: Applying the U.S. Constitution Extrater-
ritorially, 52 KAN. L. REv. 1073, 1074 (2004) ("Though the current standard of extraterritorial
applicability of the Constitution as a whole is unclear, the Supreme Court would likely find
little or no protection for nonresident aliens.").
203. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004) ("Whether and what further proceedings
may become necessary after respondents make their response to the merits of petitioners'
claims are matters that we need not address now. What is presently at stake is only whether
federal courts have jurisdiction to determine the legality of the Executive's potentially indefi-
nite detention .... "); see also supra Part H and note 53 (discussing different district court
opinions that have reached varying conclusions on this issue).
204. Though section 2769(d) of the FTCA allows the United States to be substituted as
the party in negligence suits against federal employees, it specifically states that such immu-
nity does not extend to civil action against a government employee for violations of constitu-
tional rights. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A), (d)(1) (2000).
205. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. V.
206. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment regulates the
treatment of prisoners. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) ("[S]everal
... 'forms of corporal punishment run afoul of the Eighth Amendment .... ' Among those
forms of punishment were 'handcuffing inmates to the fence and to cells for long periods of
time, . . . and forcing inmates to ... maintain awkward positions for prolonged periods."')
(quoting Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1306 (5th Cir. 1974)). Several detainees have com-
plained of having to sit shackled in uncomfortable positions for long periods, extending eight
hours or more. See TIPTON REPORT, supra note 1, Vl9 226-227, 241.
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ess claim inappropriate.2 °7 Since the detainees were detained at the
President's direction, and the President is shielded from damages li-
ability predicated upon his official acts by absolute immunity,2 8 there
is no one to hold liable for the Fifth Amendment due process viola-
tion.
Even if detainees possess substantive constitutional rights and de-
tainees could find someone to hold liable for violating their Fifth
Amendment due process rights, a Bivens action is still likely to fail.
"[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally
are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known. '2° Thus, government
actors are protected from liability for reasonable mistakes. The Su-
preme Court has indicated that the test for whether a government offi-
cial has violated a "clearly established right" is met if "in the light of
pre-existing law the unlawfulness [is] apparent."210 Under this condi-
tion, accused government officials would likely claim that the exten-
sion of constitutional rights to detainees in Guantanamo Bay does not
constitute clear establishment of those rights. This argument is likely
to succeed because it has not yet been determined whether constitu-
tional rights extend to the detainees held at the GBNB.21'
Additionally, courts would probably avoid extending the scope of
Bivens because "special factors counsel[] hesitation in the absence of
affirmative action by Congress."2 2 The foreign policy and national
security concerns surrounding the detention of foreign nationals at
Guantanamo Bay arguably constitute such special factors. Conse-
quently, a Bivens action would likely fail, even if it were determined
that the GBNB detainees do have substantive constitutional rights.
207. As a side note, a Fifth Amendment claim of compelled self-incrimination would
not be actionable unless statements made as a result of torture were actually admitted in a
criminal proceeding. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 760 (2003).
208. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982); see also discussion supra Part
III.B.2.
209. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
210. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
211. See discussion supra note 53.
212. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
396(1971).
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VI. THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE AS AN ADDITIONAL
BARRIER TO JUDICIAL ACCESS
Assuming there was a judicially cognizable remedy available to
foreign national detainees, issues of justiciability present an additional
barrier to recovery. The political question doctrine reflects concerns
about keeping the federal judiciary from inappropriate involvement in
sensitive political issues that are best addressed by the political
branches of government." 3 Under the political question doctrine, a
federal court can decline to hear a case that presents such a non-
justiciable political question.214  The doctrine generally "excludes
from judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy
choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for reso-
lution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive
Branch.'215 In addition, the political question doctrine may also ex-
clude cases when there is an "impossibility of deciding without an ini-
tial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion;
or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government;.., or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifari-
ous pronouncements by various departments on one question. 2 6
Certainly, the detention of alien prisoners at the GBNB is a sensi-
tive political issue that is likely to have consequences for U.S. foreign
relations. However, the Supreme Court has stated that, "it is error to
suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations
lies beyond judicial cognizance. 21 7 Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit has
warned, "the special needs of foreign affairs must stay our hand in the
creation of damage remedies against military and foreign policy offi-
cials for allegedly unconstitutional treatment of foreign subjects caus-
ing injury abroad. '218 This warning applies to the situation in Guan-
tanamo Bay and reflects the policy that courts should defer to the
political branches in addressing problems best resolved by those
branches, since the political question doctrine is "primarily a function
213. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209-14 (1962) (enunciating this doctrine for the
first time).
214. See, e.g., id. at 209.
215. Schneider v. Kissinger, 310 F. Supp. 2d 251, 257-58 (D.D.C. 2004).
216. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217.
217. Id. at211.
218. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 209 (D.D.C. 1985).
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of the separation of powers. ' 21 9 Arguably, the decision to detain for-
eign nationals at the GBNB during the "war on terror" involves deci-
sions made by the political and not judicial branches of government.
Indeed, Congress's passage of the AUMF and the President's subse-
quent Detention Order initiated "war on terror" and brought foreign
nationals to the GBNB. 2 ° Furthermore, Article III of the Constitution,
which defines the scope of judicial power, "provides no authority for
policymaking in the realm of foreign relations or provision of national
security. '22' Finally, it would be difficult for a court to award dam-
ages for detainees' alleged claims without "expressing lack of the re-
spect due coordinate branches of government. 2 2
The recent case of Schneider v. Kissinger indicates that the politi-
cal question doctrine may be invoked in the case of foreign national
detainees seeking compensation for harms suffered at Guantanamo
Bay.223 Schneider presented a sensitive situation similar to that of the
foreign nationals detained at the GBNB. In Schneider, the plaintiffs
alleged their father, General Schneider, was shot in an attempted kid-
napping as a result of "covert actions ... directed by [high-ranking]
United States officials[,] in connection with an attempted coup in
Chile in 1970. "1224 The court held that the political question doctrine
barred review of the plaintiffs claim. This is because decisions in the
realm of foreign affairs and national security are best left to the politi-
cal branches. The court stated: "'[t]he conduct of the foreign relations
of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the Executive
and Legislative... [branches], and the propriety of what may be done
in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry
or decision.' 1 25 The court declined to "gauge the reasonableness of
219. Carr, 369 U.S. at 210.
220. See supra Part H.
221. Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 195 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
222. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217. For example, a finding that detention at GBNB was arbi-
trary would criticize the President's Detention Order by implying it does not provide adequate
procedural safeguards to determine enemy combatant status.
223. Schneider v. Kissinger, 310 F. Supp. 2d 251, 254 (D.D.C. 2004), aff'd, 412 F.3d
190 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
224. Id. at 253-54. General Schneider was to be elected as Chile's first Socialist Presi-
dent and was "opposed [to] military intervention in the electoral process." Id. at 254. The
United States planned to neutralize him, and in their efforts to do so, the General was killed.
See id. at 254-56. Schneider's children sued Henry A. Kissinger, who was Assistant for Na-
tional Security Affairs to President Nixon at the time. IL at 254.
225. Id. at 258-59 (quoting Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918)).
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[the] foreign policy decisions... [through] balanc[ing] a myriad of
thorny foreign [policy] and domestic political considerations. 226
Similarly, the taking, detention, and subsequent treatment of
Guantanamo Bay prisoners are matters inevitably intertwined with na-
tional security and foreign policy concerns, which would require
courts to make inappropriate policy determinations. Considering the
extremely sensitive nature of the ongoing "war on terror," it is likely a
court would "decline[ ] to interpose its own will above the will of the
President or... Congress" in authorizing a remedy for alleged rights
violations occurring in Guantanamo Bay.227 Courts are especially
likely to decline review given the uncertainties regarding the end of
the "war on terror," the highly sensitive nature of the national security
interests involved in combating terrorism, and the fact that the United
States is still in pursuit of Osama Bin Laden, the main suspect in the
attacks of 9-11. 228
Under any of the potential remedies previously discussed, courts
will undoubtedly have to "gauge the reasonableness of... foreign
policy decisions. '"229 Courts have stated, "'[I]t is not within the role of
the courts to second-guess executive judgments made in furtherance
of that branch's proper role."' 230 The Supreme Court has advised that
the "nuances" of "the foreign policy of the United States.. . are much
more 'the province of the Executive Branch and Congress than of this
Court. ' 231 In addition, many cases have applied the political question
doctrine to prevent courts from reaching the merits of cases regarding
torts allegedly committed by U.S. officials against foreigners outside
the United States. 23 2  In conclusion, the political question doctrine
would likely bar any judicially cognizable claim brought by the de-
tainees. Thus, it is necessary to consider non-judicial avenues of re-
dress.
226. Id. at 262.
227. Chaser Shipping Corp. v. United States, 649 F. Supp. 736, 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
228. Bin Laden is among the FBI's ten most wanted fugitives. FBI, FBI Ten Most
Wanted Fugitive, http:/www.fbi.gov/wanted/topten/fugitives/laden.htm (last visited Apr. 11,
2006).
229. Kissinger, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 262.
230. Kissinger v. Schneider, 412 F.3d 190, 196 (quoting Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v.
Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 932 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
231. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 196 (1983).
232. See, e.g., Industria Panificadora, S.A. v. United States, 763 F. Supp. 1154, 1159-61
(D.D.C. 1991), aft'd, 957 F.2d 886 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Chaser, 649 F. Supp. at 737; Sanchez-
Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596, 597-601 (D.D.C. 1983), affd, 770 F.2d 202, (D.C.
Cir. 1985).
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VII. ALTERNATIVES TO THE JUDICIARY: THE FOREIGN CLAIMS ACT
The Foreign Claims Act authorizes the creation of claims com-
missions to provide compensation up to a maximum of $100,000
where property loss, personal injury, or death occurs because of non-
combat activities of the armed forces in foreign countries. 233 The pur-
pose of the act is "[t]o promote and to maintain friendly relations
through the prompt settlement of meritorious claims. ' 234 This admin-
istrative claims process is not subject to the same exceptions as the
FTCA, 235 and it arguably presents the most straightforward route to
seeking compensation from the U.S. government.236
The Secretary of Defense has discretion in selecting commission
members and in promulgating rules for commissions. 237 Foreign vic-
tims are spared the burden of having to travel to the United States to
seek compensation for rights violations. Since commissions are most
often established where the U.S. military has significant presence, the
act appears to apply to the GBNB.238 This administrative procedure
would thus, in theory, allow recovery for foreign national detainees
who could not otherwise travel to the United States and hire a lawyer,
assuming that the U.S. system would even hear their claims.
However, examination of the anecdotal evidence available from
the claims commission set up to compensate injured Iraqis indicate the
system is inadequate. The Occupation Watch Center in Baghdad (Oc-
cupation Watch) and the National Association for the Defense of Hu-
233. Foreign Claims Act, 10 U.S.C.S § 2734(a) (LexisNexis 2005).
If the Secretary concerned considers that a claim in excess of $100,000 is meritori-
ous, and the claim otherwise is payable under this section, the Secretary may pay
the claimant $100,000 and report any meritorious amount in excess of $100,000 to
the Secretary of the Treasury for payment under section 1304 of title 31.
Id. § 2734(d).
234. Id. § 2734(a).
235. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2000).
236. In addition, the Secretary of Defense can designate the claims commission to settle
and pay damages "caused by a civilian employee of the [Department of Defense] other than
an employee of a military department." Foreign Claims Act, 10 U.S.C.S § 2734(h) (Lex-
isNexis 2005). This provision would therefore cover non-military personnel hired by the De-
partment of Defense for the purposes of interrogation.
237. See id. § 2734(a).
238. "Foreign country" under the Foreign Claims Act "includes any place under the ju-
risdiction of the United States." Id. Therefore, the GBNB would qualify as a "foreign coun-
try" for the purposes of this act. In addition, the detention of Guantanamo Bay detainees
would be characterized under the act's broad definition of "non-combat" activity; "[a]ctivity,
other than combat, war, or armed conflict, that is particularly military in character and has
little parallel in the civilian community." 32 C.F.R. § 842.41(c) (2004).
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man Rights in Iraq compiled a Joint Report on Civilian Casualties and
Claims Related to U.S. Military Operations (Report), which discusses
the lack of successful claims brought by Iraqi victims harmed incident
to the war in Iraq.239 According to the Report, "The atmosphere, be-
havior, places and people that Iraqis must deal with as they search for
answers or try to get compensation for their injuries and losses are part
of a crescendo of frustration, disappointment and disillusion in Bagh-
dad."'2
The Iraqi claims commissions are so disorganized that Occupation
Watch has referred to this maladministration as "strategic." '241 The
commissions are characterized by missing files, extensive delays, fre-
quent procedural changes, and requests to "come back next week. 242
Additional complaints include insufficient time to present a claim and
failure to provide enough staff.243 Furthermore, the lack of impartial-
ity is alarming. Iraqi translators often showed "great familiarity with
soldiers and lawyers" and were observed being asked for advice by
military lawyers more than once 4.2  The main problem with the com-
missions is lack of neutrality; those accused of committing the harm,
the military, are responsible for making the primary decisions on
whether misconduct has occurred. As the former head of Occupation
Watch described, "[T]he real power to define an incident lies in the
hands of the very military being accused of misconduct. In essence,
they can deny everything because we don't ever know when there is a
'combat' situation. ' 245  This absence of impartiality is repugnant to
values of justice. An employee of the Iraqi Assistance Center who as-
sists Iraqis in filling out their claims for compensation estimates that
239. OCCUPATION WATCH CTR. & NAT'L Ass'N FOR THE DE. OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
IRAQ, JOINT REPORT ON CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND CLAIMS RELATED TO U.S. MILITARY
OPERATIONS 1, available at http://www.civicworldwide.org/pdfs/compensationreport.pdf.
"Occupation Watch is a nongovernmental monitoring organization backed by mostly western
peace and social justice groups." Orly Halpern, Running the U.S. Military's Compensation
Gauntlet, NEW STANDARD, July 14, 2004, http://newstandardnews.net/content/
index.cfm/items/676.
240. OCCUPATION WATCH CTR., supra note 239, at 1.
241. Id. at 3-4.
242. Id. at 4-5.
243. Id. at 4.
244. Id. at 3.
245. Halpern, supra note 239. In addition, if compensation is received, it may not be
tendered "unless the amount tendered is accepted by the claimant in full satisfaction." 10
U.S.C. § 2734(e) (2000). This provision, therefore, forecloses any further avenue of relief if
the compensation offered is inadequate.
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out of the 2,000 victims she helps on a weekly basis, "[o]nly 30 to 40
percent get compensation." 246
Certainly the history of claims commissions in Iraq indicates that
such commissions, far from "promot[ing] and... maintain[ing]
friendly relations,""24 have done nothing but invoke anger and resent-
ment by those denied compensation. As one victim who was denied
compensation asserted, "If we don't get compensation, we will
fight."248 While at first glance, the Foreign Claims Act appears to pre-
sent the most efficient and feasible avenue for detainee compensation,
in reality, the recent experience in Iraq does not provide much hope
for its successful application in Guantanamo Bay. Far from serving
the dual goals of accountability and compensation, such a military-
dominated process would only result in further degradation, while pro-
tecting those responsible for abuses. An independent, unbiased entity
with the power and credibility to investigate claims of human rights
abuses is necessary. One alternative is to create a commission mod-
eled on the ombudsman concept.
VIII. BYPASSING THE JUDICIARY ALTOGETHER: THE OMBUDSMAN
COMMISSION AS AN ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM
The ombudsman concept has received widespread global recogni-
tion.249 As of 1998, ninety countries have created such offices to in-
vestigate complaints against the government by members of the pub-
lic.2 ' In this capacity, an ombudsman serves as a government
watchdog and guardian of the law, advocating for compliance with
human rights.2 1 Used in both stable and emerging democracies, 25 2 the
246. Halpern, supra note 239.
247. 10 U.S.C. § 2734(a) (2000).
248. Halpern, supra note 239.
249. See generally WALTER GELLHORN, OMBUDSMAN AND OTHERS (1967); THE
OMBUDSMAN CITIZEN'S DEFENDER (Donald C. Rowad ed., 1965), DONALD C. ROWAT, THE
OMBUDSMAN PLAN (1973), FRANK STACEY, OMBUDSMAN COMPARED (1978).
250. INT'L OMBUDSMAN INST., OMBUDSMAN CONCEPT & ORGANIZATION,
http://www.law.ualberta.ca/centres/ioi/eng/about-ioi.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2006).
251. Jennifer Gannett, Note, Providing Guardianship of Fundamental Rights and Es-
sential Governmental Oversight: An Examination and Comparative Analysis of the Role of
Ombudsman in Sweden and Poland, 9 NEW ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 519, 519 (2003); see
also Symposium, Legal Reform: The Role of Public Institutions and Legal Culture, 35 CAL.
W. INT'L L.J. 237, 257-64 (2005) (discussing law Professor Laurence Benner's experience as
legal counsel to the Ombudsman Commission of Papua New Guinea) [hereinafter Benner].
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ombudsman's role "is to protect the people against violation of rights,
abuse of powers, error, negligence, unfair decision and maladministra-
tion in order to improve public administration and make the govern-
ment's actions more open and the government and its servants more
accountable to members of the public [sic] .,253
Typically, either a legislature or a head of state elects an om-
budsman.25 4 The ombudsman's powers include the ability to inde-
pendently investigate complaints from the public about the administra-
tion of government. 5  If the ombudsman finds a compliant is
justified, the ombudsman commission proposes a solution or remedy
in the form of a recommendation.256 The commission also issues an
annual report to the legislature concerning its investigations and rec-
ommendations, which is also made available to the public.257 While
the ombudsman commission only has the power to make recommen-
dations, it can call upon the power of public opinion to enforce its rec-
ommendations when necessary.2 58 A pivotal element of the ombuds-
man's office is that it operates independently from the legislative and
executive branches of government. This independence lends credibil-
ity to the ombudsman's findings and recommendations.
Given the absence of a sufficient remedy for foreign national de-
tainees, if Congress were to create an ombudsman commission, it
would greatly improve the chances of foreign nationals obtaining a
remedy. By impartially investigating complaints and publishing find-
ings, an ombudsman commission would also solve the problem posed
by the political question doctrine and provide an independent means
for assuring government accountability.
252. See Gannett, supra note 251 (providing a comparative analysis of ombudsman
commissions used in Poland, which is transitioning to democracy, and politically stable Swe-
den).
253. INT'LOMBUDSMAN INST., supra note 250.
254. See Benner, supra note 251, at 262.
255. See id. at 264.
256. See id. at 265.
257. See id.
258. See id.
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A. Constitutional Authority to Establish a Congressional Remedy
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution confers the power upon
Congress "to pay the debts . . . of the United States."25 9 The term
debts is broadly defined, and is "not limited to those which arise
through contract, or... written obligation, [or] which otherwise are of
a strictly legal nature. ' '1260 On numerous occasions, the Supreme Court
has indicated that "debts" extends to "those debts or claims which rest
upon a merely equitable or honorary obligation, and which would not
be recoverable in a court of law if existing against an individual. 261
This rationale is founded on the notion that the nation "owes a 'debt'
to an individual when his claim grows out of general principles of
right and justice.., although the debt could obtain no recognition in a
court of law.
262
Utilizing this power, Congress has the authority to create new ob-
ligations where none existed before.2 63  Additionally, Congress can
delegate its power to pay U.S. debts to an executive officer, an admin-
istrative board, or a court.2 64  Furthermore, Congress can pay such
debts by direct legislative enactment or through passage of a private
relief bill, granting payment as a gratuity to a claimant directly.265
Therefore, when the legal system fails to do justice, alternatives exist:
Congress has the power to pay U.S. debts by creating a judicial rem-
edy, an administrative remedy, or a direct remedy through the issu-
259. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1; see also United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 587
(1941); Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 569 (1933); Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279
U.S. 438, 452 (1929).
260. 1 LESTER S. JAYSON & ROBERT C. LONGSTRETH, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS
§ 2.14 (2005).
261. United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427, 440 (1896); see also Pope v. United
States, 323 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1944); Marion & Rye Valley Ry. v. United States, 270 U.S. 280, 284
(1926) ("Congress has power to recognize moral obligations."); Work v. United States ex rel.
Rives, 267 U.S. 175, 181 (1925) (stating that Congress granted a gratuity based on equitable
and moral considerations).
262. Realty Co., 163 U.S. at 440.
263. Pope, 323 U.S. at 9.
264. Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 452 ("Congress has a discretion either to exercise directly or
to delegate to other agencies [its article 1 § 8 power]."). The FTCA is an example of Con-
gress delegating this power to the judiciary. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000).
265. See 1 JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 260, §§ 2.02-2.05. Prior to the enact-
ment of the FTCA, there was no government liability for the harmful conduct of its employ-
ees and the injured party had to appeal to Congress. German Bank v. United States, 148 U.S.
573,579 (1893)
20061 343
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ance of a private relief bill for those harmed by tortious conduct of a
federal government employee.2 6
B. The History of Congress's Power to Issue Private Relief Bills
Prior to the enactment of the FTCA, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity absolutely shielded the U.S. government from claims based
on tort or contract.267 Such claims against the government were only
pursued through private legislation.268 As the number of claims in-
creased, Congress faced the impossible task of attempting to adjudi-
cate them.269 These difficulties eventually led to the creation of the
Court of Claims in 1855, which initially had no power to render final
decisions and served only in an advisory capacity. 270 "[W]hen the
[Court of Claims'] decision was favorable to the claimant, a [private
relief] bill [would be drafted,] which, if enacted, would carry the
Court's advisory decision into effect. '27 1 The Court of Claims, how-
ever, did not have the power to adjudicate tort claims, because the Su-
preme Court had held that such claims were not within the court's ju-
risdiction.272 It was not until 1946, when Congress passed the FrCA,
that federal district courts were given limited power to hear tort claims
against the U.S. government.273
As previously discussed, the FTCA and other judicial remedies
are inadequate for the GBNB detainees.274 Creating an ombudsman
commission with independent investigative and subpoena powers is
one solution to bridging the gap in legal remedies. This commission
could act as the original Court of Claims did, making recommenda-
tions to Congress for compensation for the passage of private relief
bills. The commission would provide appropriately crafted relief for
foreign nationals who have been victims of human rights abuses in
Guantanamo Bay.
266. See 1 JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 260, §§ 2.03, 2.10; see also Morgan v.
United States, 81 U.S. 531, 534 (1871); Pitcher v. United States I Ct. CI. 7 (1863).
267. 1 JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 260, § 2.02 (2005).
268. Id. (stating that claimants often only had an opportunity to present ex parte cases
supported by affidavits).
269. Id.
270. See id. §§ 2.02-2.03.
271. Id. § 2.03; see also United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 213 (1983).
272. See Morgan v. United States, 81 U.S. 531, 534 (1871).
273. See 1 JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 260, § 2.10.
274. See generally discussion supra Part Ill-V.
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C. Delegating Power to a Properly Constituted Administrative Body
1. The Authority to Create an Ombudsman Commission
for Human Rights
Using the article I, section 8 power to pay the debts of the United
States, Congress could pass a statute creating a Human Rights Om-
budsman Commission to address grievances asserted by foreign na-
tionals that arise from non-combat activities in the "war on terror."
Creation of this Commission would fall within Congress's power to
pay a "debt ... which rests upon a merely equita-
ble.., obligation ... [growing] out of general principles of right and
justice."275 When the United States perpetrates human rights viola-
tions, even in the context of an armed conflict arising out of a terrorist
attack upon its soil, Congress has authority to compensate such vic-
tims by virtue of a "moral obligation," even when U.S. law provides
no remedy.276
Congress could limit the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Om-
budsman Commission to claims by foreign nationals alleging human
rights abuses by U.S. officials in connection with the "war on terror."
The Commission's jurisdiction to hear such claims would be narrow.
Jurisdiction would be limited to instances in which individuals suf-
fered violations of a constitutional right, treaty right,277 a federal statu-
tory right, or a human right recognized as part of customary interna-
tional law. The Commission would only hear complaints from
victims who suffered at the hands of the United States, and were un-
able to pursue a judicial remedy. Though similar to commissions set
up under the Foreign Claims Act, the Human Rights Ombudsman
Commission would avoid the bias of commissions set up in Iraq. This
Commission could be composed in a manner that preserves its integ-
rity and neutrality, thereby giving it the credibility that is markedly
absent from the claims commissions currently operating in Iraq.
275. United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427, 440-41 (1896).
276. See id.
277. For example, the United States is a party to CAT and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810
(Dec. 12, 1948).
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2. Setting up the Commission
To ensure the Commission's integrity and neutrality, Congress
could authorize office holders from each branch of government to ap-
point members to serve on an Appointments Committee.278 By repre-
senting all branches of government, the Appointments Committee
would help ensure the Commission's independence as well as address
the separation of powers concern inherent in the political question
doctrine. The Appointments Committee would select the members of
the Ombudsman Commission by a three-fourths majority or consen-
sus. These ombudsmen would each serve for a term of years. One
ombudsman would be designated as Chief Ombudsman. In selecting
candidates, the Appointments Committee would search for educated
individuals of unimpeachable integrity with legal experience in human
rights issues. Since the personal standing and reputation of the om-
budsmen is critical to establishing the legitimacy and independence of
the Ombudsman Commission, all of the ombudsmen should be politi-
cally neutral and have impeccable character.279
The Human Rights Ombudsman Commission would have three
main functions, investigative, remedial, and informative. Congress
should grant the Commission subpoena power to take testimony under
oath. It should empower the Commission to investigate all claims by
foreign nationals alleging human rights abuses by the United States,
regardless of the locus of the complaint.28° Once the Commission had
investigated a claim, it would recommend compensation for victims of
abuse, as well as make other recommendations regarding reforms or
corrective measures. The Commission would be obligated to publish
its findings and recommendations to inform the public of the U.S.
government's treatment of human rights. This transparency would
promote governmental accountability and foster the political con-
sciousness necessary to implement the recommended reforms.
a. Investigative Function
For the Ombudsman Commission to be successful, it is critical
that it possess sufficient investigative powers, staff, and funding to
278. The President, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Speaker of the House,
and perhaps the minority leader of the Senate could serve as the appointing authority.
279. See Benner, supra note 251, at 263-64.
280. See generally id at 261-62.
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conduct competent and thorough investigations. The Commission
must have authority to pursue complaints that it deems merit investi-
gation. In addition to accepting claims from alleged victims, it could
also accept complaints submitted by family members, as well as or-
ganizations that have involved themselves with the victims and fami-
lies.28' The Commission could also initiate its own investigations.
To be able to conduct effective investigations, it is essential that
the Commission be granted subpoena power, not only to retrieve
documents, but also to summon witnesses and take testimony under
oath subject to the penalty of perjury. In addition, the Commission
should have the authority to inspect all detention centers and to inform
detainees of their right to bring claims. After conducting an investiga-
tion, the Commission would make findings of fact and issue recom-
mendations to the federal agency alleged to have committed the
wrong. In cases where its investigations found no wrongdoing, the
Commission would also publish its exoneration, thus protecting the
government from unfounded criticism.
b. Remedial Function
The Ombudsman Commission would be empowered to make rec-
ommendations to Congress, to the federal agency involved, or to both,
based on the findings of its investigation. Recommendations could
include various types of relief, including any appropriate corrective
measures necessary to remedy a violation or prevent its recurrence.
The Commission could recommend a public forum where the claimant
would have the opportunity to state his or her claim in a public setting
and receive a public apology from the appropriate federal agency.
Additionally, the Commission could recommend a damages award for
any rights violations or property damage. Once the appropriate fed-
eral agency receives a Commission recommendation, the agency
would be required to accept or reject it, and provide a written explana-
tion for any refusal. Should the agency refuse to accept or implement
the recommendation, the Commission could recommend that Con-
281. Examples of such organizations include the Red Cross, which may have had direct
contact with victims in GBNB, and non-profit organizations, such as the Center for Constitu-
tional Rights, an organization that has provided legal representation to many foreign national
detainees held at GBNB. See American Red Cross, Why the Red Cross is Visiting Detainees
at Guantanamo Bay, http://www.redcross.org/news/in/intllaw/guantanamol.html (last visited
Apr. 12, 2006); Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, What's New, http://www.ccr-
ny.org/v2/home.asp (last visited Apr. 12, 2006).
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gress award damages through the enactment of a private bill of relief.
Alternatively, Congress may remedy the abuse through other legisla-
tion.
c. Informative Function
To best hold the government accountable for human rights viola-
tions, the Commission must increase government transparency
through access to a wide media audience. Accordingly, the Commis-
sion should be required to report its findings, recommendations, and
the extent of acceptance and implementation of recommendations to
Congress annually. The creation of a Human Rights Ombudsman
Commission can serve as a powerful check on the government, sub-
jecting it to oversight while also creating a forum for redressing of
grievances that is otherwise unavailable.
Allowing the harms suffered by the foreign national detainees at
the GBNB to go unnoticed allows the United States to commit human
rights violations abroad with impunity. Even if Congress should
eventually deny such claims brought through the Ombudsman Com-
mission, detainees would have at least had the opportunity to be heard
and to inform the public of their grievances. One of the greatest sanc-
tions the Ombudsman Commission can impose is to inform public
opinion. Though the Ombudsman Commission would have no adju-
dicative powers, the publicity created by the Commission's public re-
ports would exert pressure on Congress to remedy the problems of
prolonged arbitrary detention and torture by either passing private
bills or enacting broader statutory remedies. The Ombudsman Com-
mission would thus constitute an alternative dispute resolution mecha-
nism that would be the most effective and direct means to provide the
detainees with the opportunity to be heard and granted appropriate re-
lief.
Public exposure through the Ombudsman Commission's annual
report will inform the public about the U.S. government's treatment of
human rights. This publicity may encourage members of Congress to
devote more time and consideration to not only hearing the claims of
foreign nationals harmed during the "war on terror," but also to ac-
tively seek broader remedies to prevent human rights violations perpe-
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trated by U.S. officials committed abroad.282 Establishment of the
Human Rights Ombudsman Commission would be a great stride in in-
creasing government accountability and responsiveness to human
rights abuses committed abroad. It would also politically mobilize the
U.S. public to pressure its leaders to comply with their human rights
obligations.
IX. CONCLUSION
As this Comment has illustrated, the prospect of redress for Guan-
tanamo Bay detainees under current statutory and judicial remedies
for human rights violations appears grim. The FrCA, the primary
mechanism for suing the U.S. government, appears to bar actions
based on arbitrary detention through the intentional tort, discretionary
duty, and foreign country exceptions.283 Torture claims appear more
hopeful, though the foreign country exception continues to erect a
high bar for recovery when the harm "aris[es] in a foreign country. ' 284
With the elimination of the headquarters doctrine in Alvarez-
Machain,285 presenting claims for arbitrary detention and torture will
prove exceedingly difficult since all claims by detainees arise from
harms that occurred at the GBNB in Cuba. Though Rasul extended
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to the GBNB, this extension was
based on a statutory entitlement explicitly allowing such jurisdiction
even when prisoners are not within the territorial jurisdiction of any
federal court, so long as the custodian can be reached by service of
process.286 The foreign country exception is clearly distinguishable
282. The Human Rights Ombudsman Commission could thus serve as an example for
further expanding the reach of the ombudsman concept in the United States to rights abuses of
those incarcerated.
283. See generally discussion supra Part Ill.B.
284. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2000); see also discussion supra Part IHI.B.1.
285. See discussion supra Part llI.B. 1.
286. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 478-79 ("[T]he prisoner's presence within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the district court is not 'an invariable prerequisite' to the exercise of district
court jurisdiction under the federal habeas statute. [B]ecause 'the writ of habeas corpus does
not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is al-
leged to be unlawful custody,' a district court acts 'within [its] respective jurisdiction' within
the meaning of § 2241 [(the federal habeas statute)] as long as 'the custodian can be reached
by service of process."').
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because this prohibition is expressly found in the text of the statute28 7
and can no longer be avoided by the application of the headquarters
doctrine.288 Furthermore, in Rasul, the Court said nothing to negate
Cuba's ultimate sovereignty over the territory of the GBNB,289 effec-
tively prohibiting the United States from treating it as one of its sover-
eign territories. This fact undoubtedly renders the GBNB a "foreign
country" for the purposes of the FTCA. Therefore, the FTCA is
unlikely to bring relief for foreign national detainees' claims of pro-
longed arbitrary detention and torture.
Under the ATS, detainees could arguably prove that prolonged ar-
bitrary detention and torture are actionable violations of the "law of
nations."290 However, the main barrier to utilizing this statute is that it
does not permit suits against the U.S. government.29' The ability to
sue non-governmental actors is tenuous given the difficulties that de-
tainees would have proving such individuals or corporations acted as
accomplices or co-conspirators to federal actors. Furthermore, and
perhaps more importantly, choosing to sue corporations grossly ig-
nores the goal of accountability, thereby underscoring the U.S gov-
ernment's impunity for its part in perpetrating human rights abuses.
Therefore, the ATS appears to provide an inadequate solution to de-
tainees' grievances.
Likewise, Bivens actions will also prove fruitless. Even assuming
substantive constitutional rights will be extended to those detained at
the GBNB, officials performing discretionary functions "generally are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known." '292 Given the ambigu-
ity surrounding the extension of constitutional protections to Guan-
tanamo Bay prisoners,293 an accused federal official will likely be able
287. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2000) ("The provisions of this chapter and section
1346(b) of this title shall not apply to-Any claim arising in a foreign country.").
288. See discussion supra Part I.B. 1.
289. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 466.
290. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
291. See discussion supra Part IV.D. Furthermore, the addition of the TVPA to the
ATS similarly denies relief, as it only permits claims for torture at the direction of any "for-
eign country." See discussion supra Part LV.C.
292. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
293. See discussion supra Parts ln, V.
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to successfully argue that his or her actions did not violate a "clearly
established right," and thus will be granted a qualified immunity from
such suits. 294 Bivens, therefore, offers a slim chance of recovery for
foreign national detainees.
Even in the event of a viable judicial route of recovery, the politi-
cal question doctrine will erect a barrier to recovery given the national
security and foreign policy implications surrounding the detention of
foreign nationals during the "war on terror. ' 295 Therefore, any judicial
remedy would seem to present insurmountable obstacles to recovery.
However, the United States cannot neglect its duty to hear the griev-
ances of those it has harmed during this "war on terror." It is crucial
to U.S. domestic and international legitimacy that the United States
take responsibility for the harms it has inflicted upon others. Leaving
detainees who might be innocent of any wrongdoing without any
meaningful avenue for presenting their claims aggravates the injustice
already done to them by giving immunity to those who have allegedly
violated their rights. Implicitly condoning such rights violations
against foreign nationals could have serious repercussions for the fu-
ture of U.S. foreign relations, as well as for the U.S. public's faith in
the federal government's ability to protect fundamental human rights
in times of conflict. 296 As the Department of Defense itself acknowl-
edged:
The United States strengthens its national security when it promotes
a well-ordered world of sovereign states: a world in which states re-
spect one another's rights to choose how they want to live; a world
in which states do not commit aggression and have governments
that can and do control their own territory; a world in which states
294. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
295. See discussion supra Part VI.
296. One released detainee describes his interaction with the military police at Guan-
tanamo Bay in the following way:
It seemed to us that a lot of the [military police] couldn't themselves believe it was
happening. They [told] us they wanted to get out when their time was done and
they would not go back in. They said that they felt ashamed of the Army that these
things were going on.
TIPTON REPORT, supra note 1, 162. Failure to rectify rights violations in Guantanamo Bay
could deter U.S. citizens from joining a military that does not respect human rights and re-
fuses to compensate rights violations.
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have governments that are responsible and obey, as it were, the
rules of the road.297
As an alternate method of dispute resolution, the creation of a
Human Rights Ombudsman Commission is one viable mechanism by
which the United States can fulfill its duty to take responsibility for
actions that cause harm abroad. With the creation of a properly con-
stituted Human Rights Ombudsman Commission, any foreign national
detainee could obtain official acknowledgment and reparation for
harms suffered.
By embracing the intent of the Foreign Claims Act "[t]o promote
and to maintain friendly relations through the prompt settlement of
meritorious claims,"2 98 and leaving its demonstrated deficiencies be-
hind,2 the creation of the Ombudsman Commission represents the
perfect compromise solution for this unprecedented situation. Includ-
ing the executive and legislative branches of government will alleviate
the concerns raised by the political question doctrine. With the poten-
tial to fulfill the goals of providing an effective remedy, compensating
victims, and holding actors accountable, the Human Rights Ombuds-
man Commission will provide an easily accessible forum for the for-
eign nationals harmed at Guantanamo Bay to voice their grievances
and demand a response from the appropriate federal agencies. By
manifesting devotion to fulfill the obligation to protect human rights
abroad, even when the violators are U.S. citizens, the creation of a
Human Rights Ombudsman Commission would make great strides in
promoting friendly relations between the U.S. and other nations.
Laura N. Pennelle*
297. Douglas J. Feith, Under Sec'y of Def. for Policy, U.S. Dep't of Def., Speech to the
Council of Foreign Relations: Freedom, Safety and Sovereignty (Feb. 17, 2005), available at
http://www.defenselink.millspeeches/2005/sp20050217-1082.html (emphasis added).
298. 10 U.S.C. § 2734(a) (2000).
299. See discussion supra Part VHI.
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